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I. INTRODUCTION
Annette Kolodny tells us that:
we read well, and with pleasure, what we already know how to read; and
what we know how to read is to a large extent dependent upon what we have
already read (works from which we developed our expectations and our inter-
pretative strategies).'
Can we do otherwise? Or are we forever trapped in the story of
"the Federal Courts"-as told to us first by Felix Frankfurter, James
Landis, Wilber Katz, and Harry Shulman, then by Henry Hart and
Herbert Wechsler, now by Paul Bator, Paul Mishkin, Daniel Meltzer,
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. This
Article was prepared for a panel discussion on the Future of Federal Courts Scholarship and
Teaching, sponsored by the Section on Federal Courts of the American Association of Law
Schools, held in Orlando, Florida in January of 1994. My thanks to Susan Bandes, Christine
Carr, Erwin Chemerinsky, Denny Curtis, Barry Friedman, Andrea Fugate, Rose-Ellen Heinz,
Mark Tushnet, and to co-panelists, Ann Althouse, Richard Fallon, and Henry Monaghan, all of
whom joined with me in thinking about the subject of this Article. Thanks are also owed to Bob
Cover, Martha Field, Owen Fiss, Vicki Jackson, Burt Neuborne, and Larry Sager, all of whom
helped me as a student or teacher of Federal Courts, to understand its subjects and why they
mattered.
1. Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Minefield, in Elaine Showalter, ed., The New
Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory 144, 155 (Pantheon, 1985) (essay
originally published in Annette Kolodny, 6 Feminist Studies 1 (1980)).
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and David Shapiro, with slight variations on these themes offered by
casebook and treatise writers such as David Currie, Mark Tushnet,
Howard Fink, John Jeffries, Peter Low, Martin Redish, Charles Alan
Wright, Richard Posner, and Erwin Chemerinsky? Are we inevitably
and irretrievably locked in what Richard Fallon characterizes as an
"oedipal" struggle?2
I am neither father nor son, so it is not surprising that I don't
feel "in" the story. Of equal importance, I have a very different story
to tell about "the Federal Courts" and its subject matter, texts, and
subtexts, its ideas, and its contemporary work. What follows is a brief
overview .
3
II. THE "FEDERAL COURTS": AN INSTITUTION IN QUEST OF
DEFINITION
A first enterprise in understanding and reframing4 Federal
Courts jurisprudence is to locate, descriptively, "the Federal Courts."
This activity-identifying the topic-may seem too obvious for com-
ment, but I hope to show its utility. One must start with a bit of his-
tory, going back to the "beginning" of this body of jurisprudence. The
relevant date is 1928, when Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, who
began this conversation, published their book, The Business of the
Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System.5 Three years
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev.
953 (1994).
3. For further discussion of some of these themes, see Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1989); Judith
Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 Ga. L. Rev.
909 (1990); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682 (1991).
4. To borrow Ann Althouse's penchant for architectural metaphors. See Ann Althouse,
Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 993 (1994).
5. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in
the Federal Judicial System (Macmillan, 1928). Several books predate that of Frankfurter and
Landis; these treatises address the practice, procedure, and structure of the federal courts. See,
for example, John C. Rose, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (Matthew Bender, 2d
ed. 1922); Robert M. Hughes, Handbook of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts
(West, 1904 & 2d ed. 1913); C.L. Bates, Federal Procedure at Law (T.H. Flood, 1908); A.H.
Garland and Robert Ralston, A Treatise on the Constitution and Jurisdiction of the United States
Courts (T. & J.W. Johnson, 1898); A.J. Peeler, A Treatise on Law and Equity as Distinguished and
Enforced in the Courts of the United States (Swindells, 1883); Samuel T. Spear, The Law of the
Federal Judiciary: A Treatise (Baker, Voorhis, 1883); Orlando F. Bump, The Title Judiciary in the
Revised Statutes of the United States, and the Rules Promulgated by the Supreme Court, and
Forms (Cushings & Bailey, 1881); Benjamin R. Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar
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later, in 1931, Felix Frankfurter, then joined by Wilber G. Katz (and
later by Harry Shulman), published accompanying teaching materials,
Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure.6
That book argued for a place in the curriculum for what was
then a new course, and one that was (as the authors put it) distinct
from "practice."7  Frankfurter and his colleagues8 wanted a course
appropriate to the "university law school."9 Most of the topics they
picked and the organization used in 1931 are the very categories typi-
cally addressed in Federal Courts courses today: jurisdictional ques-
tions such as the meaning of "case" and "controversy"; the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court; the power
of federal courts to make federal common law; the relationship be-
tween the state and federal courts; habeas corpus. 10
Jurisprudence of the Courts of the United States (Little, Brown, 1880); Benjamin V. Abbott, A
Treatise Upon the United States Courts and Their Practice (Diossy, 1871).
6. Felix Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz, eds., Cases and Other Authorities on Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure (Callaghan, 1931); Felix Frankfurter and Harry Shulman, eds., Cases
and Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (Callaghan, rev. ed. 1937) ("Frankfurter
and Shulman'). For a detailed history of Frankfurter's role in crafting contemporary federal
courts jurisprudence, see Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter The Architect of "Our
Federalism," 27 Ga. L. Rev. 697 (1993).
7. Frankfurter and his co.editors drew a distinction between "intellectual issues" and "the
immediately practical." Frankfurter and Shulman at vii (cited in note 6).
8. Frankfurter's co-authors, Landis, Shulman, and Katz, had all been his students. See
McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 740-41, 756 (cited in note 6).
9. Frankfurter had already begun to teach such a course at Harvard. While some believe
that a "federal courts course" dates from 1924, McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 751, the AALS
directory of 1931 listed Frankfurter and several others as having taught such courses for more
than a decade. See Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Teachers in Member
Schools 153 (West, 1931). Prior to 1931, teachers were listed alphabetically, with courses taught
noted after their names, and by law school; in 1931, the AALS added a third category, listing
teachers by courses taught and thus making this kind of information more accessible.
10. Many also share Frankfurter's view that the federal judiciary should remain very small.
See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
Cornell L. Q. 499, 506 (1928) (if one inflated the number of district courts, it would "result] in a
depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent impairment of the prestige of the federal
courts . . ."). More recent commentary in agreement includes Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Crisis and Reform 95-102, 129 (Harvard U., 1985); Richard A. Posner, Coping with the
Caseload A Comment on Magistrates and Masters, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2215, 2216 (1989) ('The
federal courts were created to be small.... The natural limits of expansion were not reached
until very recently . .. ); Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70
F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976); Address by Antonin Scalia to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted in 34 Fed. Bus. News &
J. 252, 254 (1987) (expressing concern that the growing caseload creates pressure to increase the
size of the federal judiciary, which in turn 'aggravates ... the problems of image, prestige, and
(ultimately) quality). Some commentators disagree, at least in part. See Erwin Chemerinsky
and Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 67, 69-74
(disagreeing with the "usual arguments against increasing the size of the federal bench" but
noting that some concerns remain when "large numbers of new judges' are appointed).
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In 1953, when Hart and Wechsler published their casebook,"
they expanded on but did not profoundly change the Frankfurterian
framework. 12 They were very much the heirs, and specifically the
sons, of Frankfurter, Landis, Shulman, and Katz. The question of a
title for their book might not have given them any pause. The label,
The Federal Courts and the Federal System, seemed self-explanatory.
At that time, Hart and Wechsler had a ready referent: "the Federal
Courts" were understood as comprised of the roughly 280 life-tenured
judges who sat on the then-three tiers of the federal bench: the federal
district, appellate, and Supreme Courts. 3
Two decades later, in 1973, and then again in 1988, the next
generation, Paul Bator, Paul Mishkin, David Shapiro, and Daniel
Meltzer, sons and grandsons, continued the tradition. 4 Of course, one
can sketch in a good deal more detail the history of the course, the
other authors who participated, and the body of thought now called
"the Federal Courts," 5 but these are the contours. These are the
materials, in Annette Kolodny's terms, that are "already read," the
familiar landmarks of a canon we share and know. 6 This canon,
while intricate and laced with complex doctrinal developments, is
11. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(Foundation, 1953).
12. For discussion of the dimensions they added, see Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953 (cited in
note 2). For discussion of the ways in which they follow in Frankfurter's footsteps, see
McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 741-42 nn.267, 268 (cited in note 6) (Hart had been one of
Frankfurter's students and worked on the project of "the business of the Supreme Court"); id. at
768-70 ("The Hart and Wechsler book was clearly a descendant of Frankfurter's casebook).
Frankfurter also reviewed the Hart and Wechsler manuscript, id. at 769, and is the person to
whom the book is dedicated.
13. United States Government Organization Manual 1953-54 (revised July 1, 1953).
14. Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler, eds., Hart and
Wechler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation, 2d ed. 1973); Paul M. Bator,
Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin, and David L. Shapiro, eds., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System (Foundation, 3d ed. 1988). See also Akbil Amar, Law Story, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1989) (reviewing the third edition (edited by Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro, and
Meltzer) of Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1988)).
15. Several textbooks and treatises designed for teaching predate Frankfurter and
Shulman. See Harold R. Medina, Cases and Readings on the Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
iii (West, 1926) (stating its goal as one of laying a "solid foundation of principle and precedent" but
including some "details of practice'); George Washington Rightmire, Cases and Readings on the
Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts v (W.H. Anderson, 1917) (describing the case
method "as highly desirable" for teaching federal jurisdiction). In addition, in the 1940s, Charles
T. McCormick and James H. Chadbourn authored Cases and Materials on Federal Courts
(Foundation, 1946); Armistead Dobie and Mason Ladd wrote Cases and Materials on Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 1940) (with a second edition, edited by Ray Forrester, Dobie
and Ladd. Cases and Materials on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 2d. ed. 1950)). For
additional discussion of the development of the course "Federal Courts,' see Resnik, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 684-86 (cited in note 3); McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 756-70 (cited in note 6).
16. See note 1 and accompanying text.
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comfortable. It is an exegesis of the constitutional text and structure.
The field might also be called "Toward a Theory of Article III."
Although seven decades have passed, the canon has remained
remarkably stable. Certainly, new cases have been added and
"supplemental materials" tacked on; the revised editions of Hart and
Wechsler also reveal some alterations in the substantive approach to
legal questions. 17 But no major reorganization of the structure has
occurred.18
The facts, however, have changed. Although one would not
know it by reading most Federal Courts casebooks, we must ask what
is meant by the phrase, "the federal courts." We could be talking
about the same set of life-tenured judges to whom Hart and Wechsler
referred: now 800 life-tenured judges on the trial, appellate, and
Supreme Courts. 19 But if we continue to talk about these judges as
17. Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 711-14 (cited in note 14) (different analyses of the Eleventh
Amendment and of congressional control over federal courts' jurisdiction, and of the impact of
school desegregation cases on an understanding of the role of the federal courts).
18. See Fallon, 47 vand. L. Rev. 953 (cited in note 2). The casebooks other than Hart and
Wechsler, as well as the treatises, largely reiterate its structure and themes. Sometimes a bit
more procedure is added. See, for example, Howard P. Fink and Mark V. Tushnet, Federal
Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice (Michie, 2d ed. 1987). Sometimes the focus is more directed
towards civil rights. See, for example, Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and
the Law of Federal-State Relations (Foundation, 2d ed. 1989). Other casebooks include Ray
Forrester and John E. Moye, Cases and Materials on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West,
3d ed. 1977); Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Comments, and Questions (West, 3d ed.
1989); David P. Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and-Materials (West, 4th ed. 1990); Charles T.
McCormick, James H. Chadbourn, and Charles Alan Wright, Cases and Materials on Federal
Courts (Foundation, 9th ed. 1992). The treatises include Charles Alan Wright, The Law of
Federal Courts (West, 4th ed. 1983); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
(Harvard U., 1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (Little, Brown, 1989); Martin H.
Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power (Michie, 2d ed. 1990).
But no major re-creation exists as a published teaching text.
A few new "federal courts* casebooks are about to be or have just been published. Some of
these books promise to shift the themes to some extent. See, for example, Donald L. Doernberg
and C. Keith Wingate, Federal Courts, Federalism, and Separation of Powers (West, 1994)
(focusing, according to the advertisement, on "whether Congress or the Supreme Court is the
guardian of federalism and separation of powers" and on § 1983 litigation); Louise Weinberg,
Federal Courts: Cases and Comments on Judicial Federalism and Judicial Power (West,
forthcoming 1994) (the advertisement describes it as "assimilat[ing] changes.. ., offering needed
reformulations... yet retainfing] the feel of a classic Federal Courts casebook%; additions include
discussion of preemption, nonacquiescence, and public interest and large-scale litigation); Robert
Clinton, Michael G. Collins, Richard A. Matasar, Federal Courts: Theory and Practice (Little
Brown, forthcoming 1995) (which will include more historical materials and federal Indian law).
See further Ann Althouse's call for computer renditions, without the formalization or codification
of a textbook. Althouse, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1014-15 (cited in note 4).
19. 1992 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 99 ('1992 Annual Report'). For some, the expanded size of the life-tenured federal
judiciary has already worked profound changes. See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in
a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 1 (stating that "the federal
courts today bear little resemblance to those existing... in 1958"). The changes in size have been
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"the Federal Courts," we will miss the "other" federal judges
in-literally in-the Federal Courts. These are the full-time
magistrate and bankruptcy judges who are judges without Article III
protection of tenure and salaries, whose combined numbers (about
700) make them a larger trial bench than the life-tenured, district
court judges.20
Although relatively invisible, bankruptcy and magistrate
judges do a vast amount of federal adjudication. Federal bankruptcy
judges receive some 900,000 petitions annually.21 Magistrate judges
preside over some 500,000 judicial proceedings, including social secu-
rity "appeals," habeas petitions, evidentiary hearings, pretrial confer-
ences, and more than 5000 civil trials, heard on the consent of the
parties. 22
And there are yet other judges employed by the federal system
but not in the federal courts. These are the 1140 administrative law
judges who now populate federal agencies, 23 a venue for federal adju-
dication as busy as "the Federal Courts"--even in these days amidst
cries of overcrowded dockets. In one year, the Social Security
Administration has a caseload larger than the federal courts' civil
docket.24
When Hart and Wechsler wrote in 1953, there were no magis-
trate or bankruptcy "judges." When Hart and Wechsler wrote in 1953,
accompanied by changes in the means by which cases are handled at both trial and appellate
levels. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982) (analyzing revisions of
the role of trial judges); Lauren Rebel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 Ind. L. Rev. 891,
898-904 (1993) (discussing the appellate bench's reliance on unpublished opinions, the lack of oral
argument in a significant percentage of the caseload, and the use of staff attorneys).
20. As of 1992, there were 291 full-time bankruptcy and 374 full-time magistrate judges,
plus 35 authorized but not-yet-funded bankruptcy positions. 1992 Annual Report at 99-101. See
also Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-361, 106 Stat. 965, codified as amended in
scattered sections of Title 28 of the United States Code. As of that date, there were
approximately 650 federal district court judges. 1992 Annual Report at 99.
21. 1992 Annual Report at 80 (cited in note 19). Compare the docket of the roughly 650 life-
tenured, Article HI trial judges, who receive filings of some 230,000 civil cases and some 48,000
criminal cases annually. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 83.
23. As of September of 1993, the U.S. Office of Personal Management Workforce
Information DataBase recorded 1137 AlJs. Conversations with personnel of the United States
Office of Personal Management (Dec. 30, 1993).
24. In 1988, over 250,000 hearings before administrative law judges were requested.
Anthony Taibi, Note, Politics and Due Process: The Rhetoric of Social Security Disability Law,
1990 Duke L. J. 913, 916 (citing Staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means 51 (Table 4) (the Ways and Means Committee "Green Book)). See also
Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Reform, 1990
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 481.
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agency adjudication was still nascent, cabined by the regime of
Crowell v. Benson,25 in which the Supreme Court announced its anxi-
ety about congressional delegation of the judicial function. Crowell is
an important baseline. Recall the question: Can Congress constitu-
tionally send factfinding (about injuries protected by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act) away from
the federal courts and to an agency?26 The Court upheld the congres-
sional scheme,2 but issued a warning: Be careful not to invade what
it called "the essential attributes of judicial power."28 Article III
judges had to retain the power to undertake factfinding, de novo, on
disputed claims of what the Court described as "fundamental' or
"jurisdictional" facts.29 To do otherwise would, in the Court's words,
sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and ...
establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system .
30
The Supreme Court did not define "the essential attributes of
judicial power," but the Court seemed to have assumed that it had
meaning: that life-tenured trial judges had roles Congress could not
divest; that federal judges had an identity that was unique; that fact-
finding (even in cases in which small monetary claims were made) was
a task important to the life-tenured federal judiciary.3'
25. 285 U.S. 22 (1931).
26. Specifically, the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, created pursuant
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. According
to Justice Brandeis's dissent (joined by Justices Stone and Roberts), in 1931, the deputy
commissioners had dealt with 30,383 nonfatal cases, and held hearings in 729 of them. Crowell,
285 U.S. at 94 n.31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Under the legislation, federal courts remained the
venue for challenges that awards were not "in accordance with law" and for enforcement of those
awards. Id. at 44-45.
27. Congressional authority over maritime law was "beyond dispute." Crowell, 285 U.S. at
39. The Court analogized the Act to the worker compensation laws of the states and concluded
that, like those acts, the due process objections were unavailing. Id. at 41-48 ("The use of the
administrative method... assuming due notice, proper opportunity to be heard, and that findings
are based on evidence, falls easily within the principle of the decisions sustaining similar
procedure[s] against objections under the due process clauses.. .
28. Id. at 51.
29. Id. at 54-55. Justice Brandeis, in dissent, criticized the indeterminacy of the characteri-
zation. Id. at 94-95 n.33 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 57 (Hughes, C.J., writing for the Court).
31. Crowell can be read in two ways. One reading recognizes the breadth of power that the
case acknowledged Congress held. The dispute involved what the Court characterized as "private
rights" between two disputants. Id. at 50-51. Therefore, when the Court accepted congressional
relocation of the dispute into an administrative forum, that decision could be understood as the
critical springboard to the current administrative adjudicatory state.
On the other hand, the Court reserved the power of federal judges to redetermine
"fundamental" and "jurisdictional" facts, id. at 54-55, and raised concern about Congress's effort to
"substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an
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Over the intervening half-century, agency adjudication and
other forms of non-Article III federal courts emerged and flourished.
32
administrative agency." Id. at 56' The Court warned that Congress could not "completely oust
the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its
own instrumentalities or in the executive department.' Id. at 57. Compare the subsequent
approach in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (upholding
final authority of arbitrators of disputes about payment among applicants under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
Chief Justice Hughes also spoke of the jury and special masters as under the control of the
judge, and noted that masters and commissioners work in a capacity "essentially advisory."
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 61. Both Brandeis's dissent in and the contemporary commentary on Crowell
read these aspects of the case with concern and criticize the Court for withholding power from
agencies. See id. at 65, 73-77, 80-84, 89-94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Comment, Judicial Review
of Administrative Findings--Crowell v. Benson, 41 Yale L. J. 1037, 1047-48, 1053 (1932) ("Crowell
v. Benson injects into the administration of the ... Act inconvenience and confusion which will
materially obstruct attainment of its ends.... Injured workmen will be subjected to a great deal
of litigation.... And herein lies the greatest significance of the case; the harm for which it will be
most remembered."); Note, Crowell v. Benson: Inquiries and Conjectures, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 478
(1933) (calling "questions of judicial review of administrative findings of fact" "troublesome');
Note, Administrative Tribunals-Workmen's Compensation-Scope of Federal Judicial Review
Under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1312, 1314-15
(1932) (facts established by an administrative agency should not 'go for naught"); Note, Worker's
Compensation-Power of District Court to Grant Trial De Novo on Appeal, 10 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev.
98, 100-101 (1932) (although allowing a trial de novo 'would destroy much of the effectiveness of
the Act . .. the District Courts will probably continue to limit themselves to a review of the
findings of the commissioner); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of
Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055
(1932) (the "practical result" of allowing trial de novo after an administrative hearing 'is to
undermine the effectiveness of the administrative action").
32. From the current vantage point, it might be hard to remember that not all that long
ago, administrative adjudication was not a site of enormous activity. Thus, details of the growth
in two areas-federal benefits and tax-help to enable appreciation of the changes over the course
of the century.
The Social Security system developed slowly from its inception in 1935 to 1950. In 1950, only
16% of those people over age 65 received social security benefits. Robert M. Ball, The Original
Understanding on Social Security: Implications for Later Developments, in Theodore R. Marmor
and Jerry L. Mashaw, eds., Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis 17 (Princeton U., 1988)
("Beyond the Rhetoric'). The hearings and appeals system for the programs in existence until the
mid-1950s (old-age and survivors insurance) "protected well-defined rights and protect[ed] against
administrative error" on issues such as eligibility based on age, retirement, or marital status.
Edward D. Berkowitz, Disability Insurance and the Social Security Tradition, in Gerald D. Nash,
Noel H. Pugach, and Richard F. Tomasson, eds., Social Security: The First Half-Century 292-93
(New Mexico, 1988) ("The First Half-Century"). According to some commentators, decisions about
social security did not permit much discretionary judgment. Ball, Original Understanding, in
Marmor and Mashaw, eds., Beyond the Rhetoric at 27. See also An Overview of American Social
Security, 1935-1985, in The First Half-Century at 15. However, at least some potential recipients
did not agree with the decisions rendered; according to another description, the Social Security
Board received "nearly 100" requests for hearings (protesting the prior decision of the Bureau of
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance) a month, and a "knowledge .. .of the hearing and review
procedure necessary for the settlement of claims" was of growing "importance to lawyers
everywhere." Carl H. Harper and Bernard M. Niezer, Appeals Procedure Under Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance, 16 Ind. L. J. 440, 441 n.5 (1941).
To the extent conflicts emerged, "referees" determined appeals of applicants denied benefits,
but the relatively limited set of issues appears to have prompted relatively few formal disputes.
Harper and Niezer describe a 'tremendous volume of claims" and speak of the "imperative to
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Congress passed dozens of statutes creating litigation schemes that
incorporated administrative adjudication, and law schools responded
with another body of jurisprudence, "Administrative Law." In 1968,
Congress transformed the "commissioner" system into a corps of judi-
cial officials named federal "magistrates."33 Congress then renamed
magistrates, giving them, in 1990, the title "magistrate judge."3 4 In
the 1970s, Congress replaced the referee system with bankruptcy
judges.3 5 And during these past decades, the United States Supreme
employ an informal procedure." Id. at 442. I have yet to find data on the numbers of hearings be-
fore referees prior the 1950s. Documentation of rising numbers of claims is available thereafter.
From 1950 to 1960, the percentage of those aged 65 and over (some 17 million people) who were
receiving social security benefits rose to 60%; by 1990, 90% of all persons aged 65 and over (nearly
29 million people) were receiving such benefits. Ball in Beyond the Rhetoric at 28 (Figure 1.1).
When the disability program was added in 1956, and the kinds of decisions made by the Agency
consequently altered, requests for hearings increased by more than 500% within a few years.
The number of administrative law judges grew from the 1950s onward, from 30 in 1956 to 110
in 1960 to more than 800 in 1988. Berkowitz, Disability Insurance, in The First Half-Century at
292-93. By 1975, disability appeals before administrative law judges numbered some 150,000 per
year. By 1983, the number of such appeals was 364,000. Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability Insurance
in an Age of Retrenchment: The Politics of Implementing Rights, in Beyond the Rhetoric at 166.
As of 1991, requests for a hearing before an administrative law judge numbered 327,000. Robert
S. Haberman and David G. Hatfield, The Role of the Appeals Council in the Administrative
Adjudicative Process: Unveiling the Mystery, 39 Fed. Bar News & J. 444, 447 (1992). For more
history of the Social Security system, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing
Social Security Disability Claims (Yale U., 1983); Social Security Hearings and Appeals (The
National Center for Administrative Justice, 1978).
A second example is the Tax Court, which in 1924 was established as the Board of Tax
Appeals and later called the Tax Court of the United States. In 1969, the Board moved from its
status as an agency to become classified as a "court; in both forms, the "members" (of the Board)
and later the "judges" (of the court) were appointed by the President. Harold DuBruff, The
United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis 165 (Commerce Clearing House, 1979); 20
U.S.C. § 7441 (1989). From 1924 to the late 1970s, the number of members or judges remained
constant at 16. DuBruff, The United States Tax Court at 52-53. In 1980, in response to increased
responsibilities, "the growth of complex tax litigation . . ., and the increase in the number of
petitions filed," Congress increased the number of judges from 16 to 19. Senate Report No. 96-
993, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3948; Pub. L. No. 96-436, 94 Stat. 1878 (1980),
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (1989). In October of 1986, the Tax Court had a "record high of
more than 84,000 cases," but "the Court is proud to have made substantial progress in reducing
its inventory [of cases] to less than 46,000 as of April 30, 1991." Arthur L. Nims, III, Tax Court
Management of Jumbo Cases: The New Challenge, 38 Fed. Bus. News & J. 330,330 (1991).
33. The Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968), codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402, 3060 (1985), 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 (1993). See generally Linda J.
Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1297
(1975).
34. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117. See
28 U.S.C. § 631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). According to the legislative history, the name change to
add the word judge" was "designed to reflect more accurately the responsibilities and duties of
the office." H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) (Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1990).
35. In 1973, when the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, they retitled the referee a bankruptcy "judge." See Bankruptcy Rules, Rule'9001(4)
(defining "bankruptcy judge") (adopted Apr. 24, 1973); Asa S. Herzog and Lawrence P. King, eds.,
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Court has generally acceded to congressional decisionmaking about
how much delegation of the judicial function (whatever that is) is
permissible.36
By 1982, when a plurality of the United States Supreme Court
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.37
decided that Congress had actually gone too far in delegating power to
bankruptcy judges, the Court could not exactly explain why or how.
Justice Brennan, for a plurality, invoked the phrase "essential attrib-
utes of the judicial power" but could not define those attributes. 38
Justice White argued, in dissent, for great deference to Congress,
which he thought was permitted (subject to some scrutiny by the
Court) under the Constitution to generate a myriad of non-life-ten-
ured, federal adjudicators.3 9
A few years later, in 1986, a case posed the question of whether
Congress had given too many adjudicatory powers to the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission. Justice O'Connor for the majority
adopted a version of White's balancing test.40 Courts must consider, in
her words, the "concerns that drove Congress" to fashion non-Article
III adjudication. 4 By 1989, the Supreme Court punted on the issue of
whether bankruptcy judges have the constitutional authority to con-
duct jury trials,4 and by 1990, a special committee of the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "magistrate [judges] now possess the authority
Collier on Bankruptcy 9001.07 (15th ed. 1994). In 1978, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, it continued and enshrined the title 'bankruptcy judge." Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
36. See, for example, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
37. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
38. Id. at 78 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), but changing its phrasing
from "essential attributes of judicial power" to "essential attributes of the judicial power").
39. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113-18 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Schor, 478 U.S. 833. Whether Granfinanciera, S.A v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989),
fundamentally alters that approach awaits the next Supreme Court opinion addressing the
problem.
41. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
42. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. 33. Subsequently, the Second Circuit ruled that both the
bankruptcy statute and the Constitution permit a bankruptcy judge to preside at a jury trial in a
.core" proceeding. In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court
initially granted certiorari in the case (sub. nom. Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Ben
Cooper, Inc., 497 U.S. 1023 (1990)), but later sent the case back to the Second Circuit for reconsid-
eration of a jurisdictional issue. 498 U.S. 964 (1990). On remand, the Second Circuit upheld its
jurisdiction and reinstated its previous judgment. 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991). In contrast, several
of the other circuits have held that bankruptcy judges may not preside at jury trials. See, for
example, In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 126-28 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing cases from
the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits to the contrary and joining those circuits in finding that
bankruptcy judges have no statutory authority to conduct jury trials).
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to handle, under appropriate circumstances, virtually any matter
normally decided by district judges, except for felony trials and
sentencing."
I am not suggesting that all the legal questions have been de-
cided. Courts and commentators still debate the edges of authority
permissible to grant to non-Article III federal judges. 44  Richard
Fallon urges that we draw the line at factfinding, which he believes
can be fully delegated to non-Article III judges, who in turn should be
subjected to appellate review by a life-tenured judge.4 5 Justice
Antonin Scalia argues for a different line. When Congress creates
something called "a public right" and the United States is a party,
Justice Scalia would give Congress full control ("plenary" power) over
how to fight about such rights.4 In my view, those public right cases
in which the United States is a party and Congress has provided the
governing rules are precisely the category of cases in which life-ten-
ured judges are most needed.47
Whatever line is drawn, the point is that the major assumption
underlying the debate is the existence of these other, federal, non-
Article III judges who get some substantial amount of federal adjudi-
catory power.4 Indeed, a specially chartered committee of the
43. Report of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's United States Magistrate Advisory
Commission, Study of Magistrate Within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 9 (Apr. 15, 1990)
(recommending that magistrate judges be given additional authority and that the public be
educated about their qualifications). More than a decade earlier, Representatives Drinn and
Kindness commented that '[f]rom the standpoint of appearance, procedure, and function, an
impartial observer will not be able to tell the difference between a magistrate and an Article BI
judge.* H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) at 37 (statement of Reps. Drinan and
Kindness),
44. Some of these issues are decided as a matter of statutory interpretation; others depend
on reading Article mII and the Due Process Clause. See, for example, Gomez v. United States, 490
U.S. 858 (1989) (interpreting the "additional duties" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 636 as not authorizing,
absent the consent of the defendant, the delegation of jury selection in felony trials to magistrate
judges); Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991) (in light of the defendant's consent to
magistrate voir dire in a felony case, the magistrate judge's activities fell within the 'additional
duties" clause and did not violate Article I); Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1992)
(magistrate judge lacks statutory authority to stay a prisoner's civil rights action); Taberer v.
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 954 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1992) (magistrate judges lack statutory
authority under 28 U.S.C. §636(e) to adjudicate criminal contempt committed in proceedings
before them); Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that "a general authorization
to magistrates of the authority to conduct extradition hearings does not violate Article Il"). See
also note 42.
45. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (1988).
46. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 581, 592-
602 (1985).
48. This assumption is also reflected in the popular press. See, for example, a recent head-
line in the New York Times, "U.S. Judge Frees Daily News from Maxwell Case Claim; the
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts (that is, the organi-
zation of Article III judges themselves) concluded that there is both
"growing confidence in the magistrate judges system" and that there
is "little likelihood that significant elements of existing magistrate
judge authority will be declared unconstitutional."49
Return to the problem of the canon and the rereading of what
has been "already read." In 1953, Hart and Wechsler could use the
words "the Federal Courts" as a part of the title of their book, and
readers knew what set of judges they meant. Today, if the same ref-
erent is used-and it is--one misses much of the adjudicatory action
in the federal system, and one misses the fact that life-tenured judges
are not doing it.50 One can reiterate the words "the Federal Courts"
and read what has been "already read," as if the world still existed as
it had, half a century earlier.51
III. WHAT NEW READINGS BRING
Unless one changes the story, revises the meaning of the words
"federal judges," lets in a little of that lowly world of "practice" and
talks about whom a litigant sees when she or he walks into the federal
courthouse and appears before a "judge," adds texts to make visible
the magistrate and bankruptcy judges,5 2 the administrative judiciary,
and their powers, one misses several central insights.
opening line of the story reads, "A Federal bankruptcy judge yesterday ruled invalid a claim of
more than $92 million against the American corporation that owned The Daily News of New York
when it was controlled by Robert Maxwell." Michael Janofsky, U.S. Judge Frees Daily News from
Maxwell Case Claim, N.Y. Times Cl (Mar. 10, 1994).
49. A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 271-72
(Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1993).
50. Thereby amending Henry Monaghan's comment that "[1]itigants and their lawyers can
function in a system for a long time after its intellectual underpinnings have eroded," to add that
legal academics can do so as well. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 344, 357 (1985) (Book.Review of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and
Reform (Harvard U., 1985)).
51. Even were one to continue to focus exclusively on the life-tenured judiciary, many
within it claim that profound transformations have also reordered that world. See, for example,
Rehnquist, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 19).
52. See, for example, Christopher E. Smith, From U.S. Magistrates to U.S. Magistrate
Judges: Developments Affecting the Federal District Courts' Lower Tier of Judicial Officers, 75
Judicature 210 (1992); Christopher E. Smith, United States Magistrates in the Federal Courts
(Praeger, 1990); Christopher E. Smith, Who Are the United States Magistrates?, 71 Judicature 143
(1987); Carroll Seron, The Roles of Magistrates: Nine Case Studies (Federal Judicial Center,
1985). Insofar as I am aware, relatively little information provides overviews of the roles of and
individuals who sit on the bankruptcy courts. For empirical work on those subjected to the
bankruptcy laws, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We
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First, as a descriptive matter, the federal courts are no longer a
three-tier judicial system. A fourth tier now stands at the bottom of
the hierarchy and is composed of two sets of trial judges who work in
the federal courts but lack life tenure. While the idea of a "fourth tier"
in the federal courts is not novel, the discussion of such a tier cur-
rently relates to the desirability of creating an additional appellate
court, sitting between the current courts of appeals and the United
States Supreme Court.5 If we want to add another appellate layer,
that layer will be number five. 4
Second, at an analytic level, the invisibility of the current
fourth tier (magistrate and bankruptcy judges) affects federal courts
scholarship. The lack of widespread commentary within the Federal
Courts' canon on the work of these new lower-court judges5 demon-
strates contemporary disinterest in the activity of factfinding, a phe-
nomenon of importance to those of us thinking about "the Federal
Courts," as well as about the relationship between the work of state
courts, federal courts, and other adjudicatory tribunals. Federal
Courts theorists debate the allocation of authority between state and
federal judges. One prong of the discussion assumes the importance of
Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (Oxford U., 1989); Karen
Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
1506 (1990).
53. See, for example, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67
F.R.D. 195 (Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 1975) (known as the
Hruska Commission after its chair, Senator Roman Hruska). See also Symposium, The Federal
Courts: The Next 100 Years, 38 S.C. L. Rev. 593, 597-98 (1987) (bibliography on the debate about
an Intercircuit Panel).
54. Similarly, the current debate about the size of the federal judiciary misstates the
number of federal judges. Once magistrate and bankruptcy judges are understood to be federal
judges, the magical "1000" limit that some have proposed for the federal courts has already been
passed. Compare Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges--The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76
Judicature 187 (1993) (arguing that increasing the federal judiciary beyond 1000 'would make it a
vast, faceless bureaucracy" and threaten its proper functioning), with Stephen Reinhardt, Are
1,000 Federal Judges Enough? N.Y. Times, A17 (May 17, 1993) (arguing that limiting the federal
judiciary's size to 1000 would make it "an elitist institution," unjustifiably curtailing public access
to the federal courts); Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the
Federal Courts, 79 ABA J. 52 (Jan. 1993). See also Posner, The Federal Courts at 26 (cited in note
10) (discussing the 'thousands" of other federal judges who lack life tenure and his decision not to
consider them a part of the federal judiciary but rather as an 'alternative court system"); Posner,
137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2215 (cited in note 10).
55. As contrasted with scholarship on the constitutionality of their existence. See, for
example, Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article I1, 65 Ind. L. J. 233 (1990), followed by a symposium discussion with essays
including Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 Ind. L. J. 277 (1990); Larry
Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette, 65 Ind. L. J. 283 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 Ind. L. J. 291 (1990); and David A.
Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 Ind. L. J. 307 (1990).
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federal factfinding. Some commentators argue that federal factfinding
offers unique qualities that justify relitigation of certain kinds of
questions, such as habeas corpus review of the constitutionality of
criminal convictions, decided initially in states.5 An implicit assump-
tion is that life-tenured judges make this special contribution. But
(with insights gleaned from the world of "practice"), one knows that
magistrate judges now do a substantial proportion of habeas adjudica-
tion.5 7 If one wants to make a claim about the desirability of federal
factfinding, one can no longer rest it on the special quality of the life-
tenured judge as factfinder. Theories will have to change.
Third, there is a problem categorizing this array of "other"
federal judges. Recall that the Hart and Wechsler format (as well as
the case law, until recently) spoke of something called "legislative
courts," as do many law review articles on the subject. We (who wrote
and spoke about these questions) used to speak about two catego-
ries-either Article I judges or Article III judges. We cannot do that
any longer. Magistrate and bankruptcy judges are neither fish nor
fowl, neither Article I nor Article III judges. They are non-Article III
judges in the Article III judiciary. Administrative agencies present
yet another example of institutions, central to United States govern-
ment in 1993, but not easily fit into constitutional categories.
That we have no constitutional category for nagistrate and
bankruptcy judges or for agencies is the key. This gap reveals a
central problem for contemporary Federal Courts theory, teaching,
and scholarship. If the current structure of "the Federal Courts" does
56. On the special role of federal factfinding, see, for example, Larry W. Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1985); Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux= The Supreme Court
and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2467, 2489, 2493 (1993); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331,2378-81 (1993).
57. Habeas corpus petitions constitute 40% of the magistrate judges' dockets. See Director
of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report 25, 140 (1990). See also Seron, The
Roles of Magistrates at 83 (cited in note 52) (stating, "Magistrates' . . . duties are often seen as
synonymous with prisoner petitions and Social Security cases."); Smith, United States
Magistrates in the Federal Courts at 151 (cited in note 52) (noting that in 1987, magistrates
handled 27,000 prisoner cases, including about 10,000 habeas petitions). Barry Friedman reminds
me that in addition to the magistrate judges, our attention should be turned to the administrative
apparatus (including the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, and the Federal Judicial Center) that has grown around the federal
judiciary. Letter from Barry Friedman, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, to the author
(Jan. 21, 1994) (on file with the author).
58. For example, could one develop a parallel argument for a federal preference based on
the fact that other federal judges are employees of the federal government, rather than the
states? Would one want to advocate that the life-tenured judiciary attempt to socialize their non-
life-tenured colleagues to imbue them with a sense of affiliation and purpose akin to that said to
be possessed by life-tenured judges?
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not mirror the constitutional framework nor fit easily into it, maybe
the Constitution itself cannot be used to tell the Federal Courts
story.59 And, since the Frankfurter/Hart/Wechsler Federal Courts
story is a constitutional story, maybe it is time for exactly the major
reconception to which Richard Fallon alludes.6°
Frankfurter, Hart, and Wechsler tell not only a constitutional
story, they also tell what I call a "cheerful" story61 (and perhaps this is
what Richard Fallon means when he terms it a "complacent" story).62
The basic claim is that, in 1789, the United States Constitution both
provided the framework for the institutions of government and solved
the basic problem of the terrorizing fear of too much power. The
Constitution is a compact, a consensual document that imposed legal
constraints that have guided the nation ever since. Sure, there have
been "bumps" along the way (such as slavery, the Civil War, and the
race riots of the twentieth century), but we, as in 'We the People,"
have persevered. If it has not come out all right yet, it will soon; what
is needed is patience, and constitutional faith.
The casebooks are not quite so direct, but their subtexts as-
sume and convey these points. Look at the current governing canoni-
cal regime. Several Federal Courts casebooks6s begin with Marbury v.
Madison" which is used to state the basic principles: that the states
or their people 5 came together and bestowed power on the federal
government by forming a compact; that the government of the United
States is one of "powers limited"; that the Supreme Court holds the
power to decide when other branches of the federal government have
unconstitutionally "transcended" their powers; and that the
59. Or at least not without addendum A la Bruce Ackerman's 'constitutional moments."
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L. J. 453, 456-61, 488-89
(1989) ('Ackerman, Constitutional Politics").
60. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 983-85 (cited in note 2).
61. I believe that this perspective is evident not only in Federal Courts but also in much of
the constitutional law curriculum of which the Federal Courts course is a part. See Judith
Resnik, Ambivalence: The Resiliency of Legal Culture in the United States, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1525
(1993).
62. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 975 (cited in note 2).[Vanderbiltl
63. See, for example, Hart and Wechsler at 72 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14); Low and Jefflies,
Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations at 1 (cited in note 18); David P. Currie,
Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 19 (West, 3d ed. 1982). But see Fink and Tushnet, Federal
Jurisdiction at 3-22 (cited in note 18) (beginning with a discussion of the "allocation of power
between state and federal courts").
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. Depending on one's view of the debate about whether states or the people made the
original compact. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987).
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Constitution is the repository of statements of those powers and limits
on the federal government's authority.
I do not want to be interpreted as painting with an overly
broad brush.6 6 Marbury also exemplifies rights unremedied and the
conflict between institutional obligations of restraint and individual
liberties. One reading of the much-read Hart and Wechsler "Dialogue"
is that it is replete with confessions that the system may provide no
remedy for constitutional injuries.6 7 Further, many of the "big" cases
taught in traditional courses include distressing examples of govern-
ment power. The Federal Courts' canon is full of sad examples, unan-
swered questions, and doctrinal tensions; the very word "tensions" is
aptly placed in the title of one of the hornbooks for the course.68
However, even with these tensions, comfort can be found.
While the meaning of "powers limited" is complex, as each account of
the Federal Courts story quickly develops, we (readers) are guided
through a maze of arguments. For example, when considering the
power of Congress over the jurisdiction of the federal courts, questions
soon emerge about the breadth of authority granted in Article III to
the Congress. Congress is often said to have "plenary power" over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts--but then, not quite. Most commen-
tators assume that somewhere in the Constitution, there are limits.69
Lawrence Sager used the hypothetical of a Congress "restricting juris-
diction to plaintiffs of a particular race, religion, or political affiliation"
as an illustration of the limits of Congress's power, circumscribed not
by Article III but by the Fourteenth Amendment. 70
66. I can hear echoing a line from the Hart and Wechsler "Dialogue*: "There you go
oversimplifying again." Hart and Wechsler at 398 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14).
67. Hart and Wechsler at 393-423 (3d ed.). But see the ending paragraphs of that dialogue
in which we are reminded that the state courts are 'the primary guarantors of constitutional
rights," that their jurisdictions cannot be regulated "unconstitutionally* by Congress, and that
"jurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally." Id. at 423.
68. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power (cited in note
18).
69. See, for example, essays such as Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960) (presenting a
structural argument for Supreme Court jurisdiction based on its "essential functions of uniform-
ity and supremacy). Compare Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (1984).
70. Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 17, 26-30 (1981). See also Hart and Wechsler at 383 n.5 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14) (stating
that if Congress were to add "a proviso to section 1331 closing the doors of the federal courts in
federal question cases to plaintiffs who were black, or Jewish," it would violate the Fifth
Amendment).
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Thus, while Federal Courts ,doctrine and scholarship are
always working at the edges, at the permissible scope of one
institution's power and the potential for incursion on another, Federal
Courts doctrine and scholarship have a generally comforting bottom
line.71 In this case, while Congress has enormous power, it is not
utterly unfettered; the Constitution serves as a safety net.
Constitutionality is at the heart of discussions of the Federal
Courts. From the principle of limited governmental powers con-
strained by constitutional commitment (if not always by the text it-
self) problems arise: How do we explain and rationalize the growth of
national powers in the context of a history of dual sovereignty, of a
government founded on the idea that the states or the people have
consented to a form of simultaneous yet non-identical power held by
state and federal governments? The recurring questions of the cur-
rent canon are: Who (the federal government or the states) has the
authority to decide what issues? What kind of deference do federal
courts owe to the states? Richard Fallon's excellent essay, The
Ideologies of Federal Courts Law,72 captures these themes very well, as
he outlines the struggle between the federalist and nationalist mod-
els. 73
However that struggle plays out, the operative assumption is
that the struggle is a bounded one, made all right because it is played
out within a constitutional terrain that allocates power, that checks,
that balances. Thus, the two central ideas of the subject mat-
ter-power and sovereignty-are tamed, domesticated, made safe first
by the imagined moment of consent that authorizes both sovereignty
and power and second by the Constitution that explicates the rules
and makes that power safe. We know it can work every time we hear
the phrase "our federalism."
74
71. Another line from the Hart and Wechsler 'Dialogue* comes to mind: 'Well, III admit
that all this makes Sheldon and McCardle a little less frightening. But only a little less so." Hart
and Wechsler at 401 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14).
72. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141, 1151-
64 (1988). See also Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 698-710 (cited in note 14).
73. Fallon's discussion for this symposium also illuminates Hart and Wechsler's methodo.
logical assumptions; as he terms them, the "principles" of 'institutional settlement, of anti-
positivism, of structural interpretation, of the rule of law, of reasoned elaboration, and of
neutrality," guide readers through a tour de force of legal analysis, Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at
963-69 (cited in note 2), that (as Henry Monaghan put it) offers 'beauty in details." Henry
Monaghan, Commentary at the American Association of Law Schools Panel Discussion on the
Future of Federal Courts Scholarship and Teaching (Jan. 8, 1994).
74. The coining of the phrase is generally attributed to Justice Black. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). For Frankfurter's role in crafting this jurisprudential stance,
see McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 703-712, 731-68 (cited in note 6). "Our" is an important aspect
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But here again (as in the meaning of the very words "the Fed-
eral Courts"), events and information, once added, pull the rug out
from under this comfortable, "well read" story, and make it less easy
to "read with pleasure." Moreover, the facts that need be added here
are not only ones of recent vintage,", produced by decades of new
legislation and changing worlds, but also old facts, discretely omitted
from the original telling. It is worth looking at what is omitted, be-
cause out of the omissions competing, disturbing, but interesting
narratives emerge.
Let's start with the great grandfather himself, Felix
Frankfurter.76 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.71 is one
of his landmark contributions to the Federal Courts terrain. In that
case, Frankfurter announced the doctrine of Pullman abstention, an
important rule of federal courts' jurisprudence: the "avoidance of
needless friction with state policies."78 Federal courts should decline
jurisdiction and not decide federal constitutional questions in a
"sensitive area of social policy,"79 if deference to state court interpreta-
tion of unclear state statutes or regulations could avoid the need for
federal constitutional law explication.
It sounds plausible, a modestly benign accommodation that
shores up assumptions of limited federal powers and works out some
of the kinks of dual sovereignties ° Further, with Martha Field's help,
we (Federal Courts teachers) know how to explain the analytic prem-
ises of abstention and how it intersects with other doctrinal develop-
ments.81
The casebooks let a reader know that at issue is a complaint
brought by people then called "Negro" porters against a Texas
Railroad Commission rule that required conductors, not porters, to be
of the claim, and a poignant one, given the many who feel excluded. See note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
75. Such as the creation of the judgeships for the bankruptcy court and magistrate judges.
See notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
76. See McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 697 (cited in note 6).
77. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
78. Id. at 500.
79. Id. at 498.
80. Frankfurter might have described his doctrinal invention as an example of what he had
earlier called for in an essay on the allocation of power between the state and federal courts-not
"moral issues to be tested by abiding truths ... [but] the domain of administrative effectiveness
and [procedural] adaptations.-matters not of principle but of wise expediency." Frankfurter, 13
Cornell L. Q. at 506 (cited in note 10).
81. See Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071 (1974); Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine
Today, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590 (1977).
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in charge of the sleeping cars on trains. As Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained, "As is well known, porters on Pullmans are colored and con-
ductors are white.."82 But neither Frankfurter's opinion nor the case-
books tell one much about how painful the record of the case was. The
testimony in Pullman is filled with discussion of how white women
feel "a little bit safer... with a white man conductor in charge of that
car." Take one of the questions: "would [it] be safer for [white girls]
protection for them to be under the care of a conductor than it would
be for them to be only under the care of a negro porter?"' Further, in
an effort to prop up the porters' claims, the record also includes
testimony aimed at distinguishing "the Pullman porter[s]," as "pretty
high-classed colored men," from those other kinds of "colored men."84
Race, class, and gender, and the effects thereof, are discretely
downplayed. These elements are not highlighted in the "Federal
Courts story," as handed down to us. In 1941 it was, I take it, not
obvious how federal constitutional law would decide this question. It
was not easy because national norms did not readily trump local cus-
toms and prejudices, indeed because national norms may well have
shared such prejudices. Thus, the case was "sensitive," the engage-
ment between federal and state law fraught with anxiety, and if some
other point of law could determine the outcome without having to
consider announcing federal constitutional rules about discrimination
based on race, more the better.8 5
But we who discuss Pullman in 1994 should not look upon it as
a quaint relic of bygone days because today, we so easily engage with
these problems. White women fearing black men is not an easy con-
82. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497. This phrase is cited in most of the casebooks. See, for
example, Hart and Wechsler at 1354 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14). In the movie "The Palm Beach
Story" (directed by Preston Sturgis, produced by Paul Jones, for Paramount Pictures, released in
1942), the appearance of a lone "negro porter" makes vivid the segregated world that the Pullman
case knew.
83. Record of Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), microformed
on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microform, Inc.) at 23-27.
84. Id. at 27.
85. As Henry Monaghan reminded me, the United States Army remained segregated in
1941 as well. See Exec. Order Nos. 9980 & 9981, 3 C.F.R. §§ 720.722 (1948) (President Truman
prohibiting "discrimination because of race, color, religion, or national origin" in the civil service,
and mandating the "equality of treatment for all persons in the armed services without regard to
race, color, religion or national origin"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 499, 510-22 (1991) (analyzing the military's
history of exclusion by race). As Susan Bandes pointed out, the casebooks do not much question
why a Texas statute "to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination in the rates, charges
and tolls of such railroad" could be assumed a ready vehicle for responding to racial
discrimination. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499 (quoting the statute). Letter from Bandes to the author
(Jan. 24, 1994) (on file with the author).
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versation today, because those fears (and others) still animate federal
policy. "Our" federal government has a penalty structure for drug
crimes that punishes crack more harshly than it punishes powdered
cocaine.86 Given the demographics of the users of the two forms of the
drug, "our" federal policies affect black men and women differently
than whites.,7 Further, "our" Supreme Court has specifically declined,
in the McCleskey case, to consider broad-based challenges to the death
penalty on racial grounds.88
Thus, the "sensitive" issues of race, gender, and class remain
sensitive today, as in the era when Pullman was decided; how federal
jurisdictional doctrine should express that disquietude is a problem for
the present day as well. It is incumbent upon me to speak of the pain
of federal law-jurisdictional and otherwise-as I tell my students
this part of "our" story, our contemporary (not only our historical)
story. 9  Further, the racism is not only "out there"-in Congress's
sentencing guidelines, in the states' death penalty systems, in the
86. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines set the penalty for 'unlawful manufacturing,
importing, exporting, trafficking or possession" of cocaine base (crack) higher than for cocaine.
For example, a person can be sentenced to from 15 to 46 months imprisonment for having 25-50
grams of cocaine and receive the same sentence for having 250-500 milligrams of crack. United
States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1993) (Level 22 offense:
cocaine - 300 < > 400 g, base - 3 < > 4 g; 41-105 months imprisonment; Level 34 offense: cocaine -
15 < > 50 kg, base - 150 < > 500 g; 151-327 months imprisonment).
87. For discussion of the possible disparate racial impact of these guidelines, see Samuel L.
Meyers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in
Punishment., 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 781, 790 (1993) (stating that "evidence seems to suggest that
blacks were more likely to use crack cocaine than whites," and therefore punishing crimes
involving crack more harshly than those involving cocaine may have a discriminatory 'effect...
against blacks"; also discussing other factors used in sentencing and/or parole that can have
discriminatory effects); William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums:
Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1992) (stating that "it is quite likely that
mandatory minimums have a disproportionate racial impact because of the higher penalties for
the sale and distribution of crack compared with those for powder cocaine") (footnote omitted).
Courts have responded to these claims, sometimes finding that the classifications are irrational
andlor animated by impermissible discriminatory effect or purpose. See, for example, United
States v. Clary, 1994 WL 68288, *26-*27 (E.D. Mo.) (finding unconstitutional-as arbitrary and
irrational, and animated by 'unconscious racism"-federal legislation that mandates punishment
of crack cocaine "100 times greater" than for powder cocaine); State v. Russell, 447 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1991) (finding that statutory distinction between crack and cocaine powder violated the
state's equal protection clause). Other courts have not so found. See, for example, United States
v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no racially discriminatory purpose and
that a racially discriminatory impact does not suffice for federal equal protection challenges);
United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that no suspect class or
fundamental right is implicated by the distinction made between crack and powder cocaine, nor is
the classification arbitrary or irrational).
88. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
89. See generally Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday on the Potomac, in Toni Morrison,
ed., Race-ing Justice, En-Gendering Power Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas and the
Construction of Social Reality (Pantheon, 1992).
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rules of the Texas Railroad Commission. There is a growing, thick,
and depressing documentation that the federal courts are sometimes
themselves places of discrimination.
Many Federal Courts commentators are happy to revise the
Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts story to make a place for the civil
rights revolution of the 1960s and to locate the federal courts at the
center of the battle for equal protection.90 These can be understood as
moments for civic pride, and one's view of the likelihood and desirabil-
ity of federal court action to protect civil rights affects the kinds of
claims made to explain a preference for federal adjudications1
But how do the data, about the federal courts as places in
which discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity can
occur,9 2 fit into theories of preferences for federal versus state
adjudication?9 3 What are we to make of the leadership role of the
state court systems in responding to these concerns before federal
courts began to take up these subjects?9 4 Once we know about the
90. Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1158-59 (cited in note 72), details the impact of the Civil War
and the civil rights movement of this century on the "Nationalist' model of Federal Courts'
doctrine; Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 703 n.71 (cited in note 14), criticizes the 1988 edition for
failing sufficiently to take the impact of post-Brown v. Bd. of Educ. developments into effect. For
the view that the question of whether to prefer state or federal courts is an empirical one without
answer, and that the choice should belong to plaintiffs, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 235-37 (1988).
91. See, for example, Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977).
92. As of 1994, task forces examining the effects of gender, race, ethnicity, and/or religion
on federal courts are underway in several circuits, including the First, Second, Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and that of the District of Columbia. The Ninth Circuit's Gender Bias Task Force has
issued both a preliminary and a final report. See The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts:
The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force (1993), to be reprinted in 67 S. Cal.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1994) (Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender); Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, Preliminary Report (July 1992); Executive Summary of the Preliminary Report of the Ninth
Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2153 (1993). See also Barbara Allen Babcock,
Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2143
(1993); Deborah Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statistics, 45 Stan. L.
Rev. 2187 (1993); Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2195
(1993).
93. One form of that debate involves discussion of whether and how to compare federal and
state court adjudication. See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 593 (1991); Chemerinsky, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233 (cited in note 90); Neuborne, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (cited in note 91); Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1143-44 (cited in note 72); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor
Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 369 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and
Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L.
Rev. 329 (1988).
94. In 1982, New Jersey became the first state to commission a task force on gender bias.
See The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts
(New Jersey, 1984). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Feminist Jurisprudence and
Procedure, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1209 (1993). See also the 1988 Resolution of the Chief Justices of all
the state courts, Conference of Chief Justices Resolution XVIII, "Task Forces on Gender Bias and
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women who practice in the federal courts but describe it as a place in
which they feel awkward, as if they were in an exclusive white male
club, does that affect how one sings the praises of the federal courts?
5
What is the impact on the theme of federal courts' leadership on race
relations of the fact that, as of 1992, the entire Ninth Circuit had 64
sitting bankruptcy judges, none of whom was a person of color and all
of whom were appointed by the appellate court 9 6 Under which of the
Hart and Wechsler topics should we discuss that federal judges are
reportedly uninterested in Title VII sex discrimination claims?97 That
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court campaigned
against federal jurisdiction over the Violence Against Women Act and
explained that the federal courts were a "scarce national resource," to
be reserved for problems of national import98 That doctrines, like the
"domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction," set up a
Minority Concerns," 26 Ct. Rev. 5 (Fall 1989) (calling for study of bias); Conference of Chief
Justices, Resolution Urging Further Efforts for Equal Treatment of All Persons (adopted Jan. 28,
1993), in Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender at A-13 (cited in note 92).
In contrast, in 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, chartered by Congress, concluded
that study of such biases in the federal system was not needed and that education would suffice.
The Federal Courts Study Committee, The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 169
(Apr. 2, 1990). However, in 1992, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a
resolution calling for each circuit to study and conduct education programs on bias. Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 64 (Sept. 22, 1992) (Bias in the
Federal Judiciary), in Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender at A-11 (cited in note 92).
95. See Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender at 21-23, 27-28 (cited in note 92); Christine
Carr, Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Surveys: The Survey Instruments and the
Compilation and Analysis of the Margin Comment Responses, Working Paper, Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force (June 1993).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)(1988) (authorizing appointment of bankruptcy judges); Report of
the Conference, Ethnicity, Race, and Religion and the Ninth Circuit 4 (Jan. 27, 1993). Several
states have commissioned task forces on the effects of race, minority status, and ethnicity on
courts. See, for example, Final Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Task Force on
Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Courts (Michigan, 1989); New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on
Minority Concerns, Final Report (New Jersey, 1992); Minority and Justice Task Force: Final
Report (Washington, 1990). These studies document widespread concerns about unequal
treatment, perhaps requiring that, under the "parity" debate, federal courts scholars compare
whether the claims of biased treatment vary by federal and state court.
97. Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender at 125 (cited in note 92).
98. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
24 The Third Branch 1, 1-2 (1992) (urging Congress to follow the conclusions of the Judicial
Conference then opposing the legislation). See also Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Gender-Based Violence 6 (Sept. 1991) (the report, which argued against federal ju-
risdiction, was prepared by the special ad hoc committee appointed to study the legislation by the
Judicial Conference of the United States). n 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States
changed its position, based again on work from its Ad Hoc Committee, reconvened with the
Honorable Stanley Marcus as its chair. The Conference voted to take 'no position on specific
provisions" of the proposed legislation and endorsed Title V, which encouraged "circuit judicial
councils to conduct studies with respect to gender bias in their respective tribunals." See Judicial
Conference Resolution on Violence Against Women (Mar. 1993), reprinted at Appendix A-11 of
Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender (cited in note 92).
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public/private distinction not even discussed in many of the
casebooks? That the casual treatment of this abstention doctrine
replicates women's experiences of exclusion from the federal courts?9
What else is not said by Hart and Wechsler and their sons that
helps to maintain the gloss? Missing is discussion of the problematic
nature of the claim that consent justifies federal power. First, take
the states. As is familiar, the original thirteen states signed on to the
Constitution; however, this country was also ripped apart by a civil
war, in which several states opted out. As Bruce Ackerman has de-
tailed, the revisions of the Constitution that followed the Civil War
cannot fairly be described as enacted in a "constitutionally" correct
fashion.1'0
The Fourteenth Amendment is hailed as the major remaking of
the Constitution that retrieved the country from Justice Thurgood
Marshall's accusations of its essential racism. But the Fourteenth
Amendment may not have been added legally, in the sense that the
requirements of Article V of the Constitution were not met. Although
the Amendment was proposed by two-thirds of both the House and the
Senate, as required by the Constitution, representatives from the
Southern states were excluded from that Congress.1°'
The constantly contested constitutional framework could easily
be made plain in the context of contemporary federal courts classes.
Most of the books include the case of Ex Parte McCardle.102 But just
like Pullman, the discussion of McCardle that appears in several
casebooks is relatively benign. One does not know (from reading case
books) the words for which William H. McCardle, an editor of a news-
paper, The Vicksburg Times, was imprisoned. He published an edito-
rial, stating that the Northern generals, then governing the South,
were:
each and all infamous, cowardly, and abandoned villains, who, instead of
wearing shoulder straps and ruling millions of people, should have their
heads shaved, their ears cropped, their foreheads branded, and their persons
lodged in a penitentiary.' °3
99. See Resnik, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1696-1700, 1730-50 (cited in note 3).
100. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. J.
1013, 1065-69 (1984); Ackerman, 99 Yale L. J. at 457-59, 500-10 (cited in note 59); Bruce A.
Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 44-47 (Belknap, 1991).
101. Ackerman, 93 Yale L. J. at 1066, 1068 n.103; Ackerman, 99 Yale L. J. at 502-03.
102. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
103. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229,
236 n.42 (1973) (quoting the Vicksburg Times, Nov. 6, 1867).
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The North locked him up for those words; he tried to gain release from
the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held the
case until after Congress took away the Court's jurisdiction, enabling
the Court to duck having to decide the constitutionality of
Reconstruction.1 0 4
McCardle is not the best example of a constitutional vision that
the union is predicated on either the concept of "powers limited" or of
consent. Congress's repeal of the Court's jurisdiction was driven,
according to Ackerman, by its "anxiety" that an "adverse judicial de-
termination might well have jeopardized the Congress/Convention's
effort to reconstruct the South in a way that would ensure enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment."10 5 While McCardle stands, in the
Federal Courts casebooks, for the proposition of deep federal court
deference to congressional restructuring of Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion,106 few books detail Mr. McCardle's First Amendment claim to
enable students to see that the Court's act of deference is deeply
problematic to contemporary sensibilities.107  The Federal Courts
104. In 1868, the Supreme Court had deferred decision on a habeas petition challenging
Reconstruction. When, overriding the President's veto, Congress passed the Act of March 27,
1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44, Congress repealed the jurisdictional route by which McCardle had
reached the Supreme Court. However, in Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868), the Court
considered a similar habeas petition, reaching the Court by an alternative jurisdictional provision,
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided for the Court to have habeas jurisdiction over cases in
which persons were in custody under the authority of the United States. When McCardle is read
in light of Yerger, some commentators argue that McCardle does not stand for total congressional
control over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. See the discussion in note 107; Henry M. Hart Jr.,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953) (dialogue also reprinted in the Hart and Wechsler casebook);
Ratner, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 179-80 (cited in note 69).
105. Ackerman, 93 Yale L. J. at 1066 n.98 (cited in note 100). Ackerman sees the Court's
"abdication in McCardle" as not validating congressional activities but rather as having
"emphasized their anomalous character." Id.
106. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514 ("We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the
legislature.").
107. See Hart and Wechsler at 364-66 (3d ed.) (cited in note 14) (citing Van Alstyne, 15 Ariz.
L. Rev. 229 (cited in note 103), as a "splendid account" and mentioning the detention as prompted
by "the publication of articles alleged to be incendiary and libelous in a newspaper of which he
[McCardle] was editor").
Several of the casebooks do add note materials that talk about the Reconstruction strife. See,
for example, Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials (cited in note 63), who provides a fuller
discussion, beginning with the observation that "[jiudicial opinions do not always tell the whole
story." Id. at 100-04 (describing the imprisonment for 'incendiary and libellous articles," that
McCardle's claim was that the Reconstruction Acts "were unconstitutional," and that "President
Johnson had the courage to veto the jurisdiction bill during his own imprisonment trial"). See
also Low and Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations at 167-71 (cited in
note 18) (on one hand, discussing more of the details of the Reconstruction battle but on the other
hand stressing, at note 2, how McCardle can be read more narrowly and that the "Court knew
perfectly well that it was not giving up much"); Fink and Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction at 247-50
(cited in note 18) (in notes both describing the "political background" and how Yerger may limit
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casebooks make little of the point that "our federalism" is founded in
part on conquest, with the power of the guns of the North subduing
the South, or of the role judicial "anxiety" has played upon occasion in
animating separation-of-powers doctrine. Conquest for good reasons
but conquest nevertheless, complete with the nastiness and violation
of all sorts of civil liberties principles that are common features of war
and conquest.' °8 Conquest and a court that stood by, perhaps appro-
priately anxious in light of its own fragility, perhaps not.1°9
One possible response for today's scholars and teachers is that
the battles were fought more than 100 years ago, and hence should
not and do not frame current doctrine and discussion. One might be
tempted to agree, were there not contemporary examples of conquest:
the federal government's continuing control over groups denominated
(by the federal government) as "federal Indian tribes."ll ° While the
issue of sovereignty is a central problem of federal courts scholarship,
and while federal law recognizes that tribes have something called
"sovereignty"-more accurately, "dependent sovereignty"-federal
courts casebooks and jurisprudence make little mention of the rela-
tionships among Indian tribes, the federal government, and the
states.
The absence of discussion of federal Indian law is, at one level,
odd. The case law on tribal sovereignty and the case law about state
sovereignty use many of the same terms and work on parallel analytic
problems: the respective reaches of executive, judicial, and congres-
sional authority; the allocation of power between states, tribes, and
McCardle); Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rev. at 223-30 (cited in note 93) (including a lengthy excerpt of
Van Alstyne's analysis of how the Bill of Rights constrains congressional authority over federal
jurisdiction).
108. See, for example, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding the secret trial before a military commission while civilian
courts were available and functioning); Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.-The Nazi
Saboteur Case, 28 Cornell L. Q. 54 (1942) (discussing how the eight alleged saboteurs were
arrested, tried in the United States by military tribunals, and several were executed; the
Supreme Court upheld the powers of the military tribunal).
109. Federal Courts casebooks do devote a good deal of attention to the question of
prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction; the question is how clearly the casebooks
focus on how those doctrines have been used when the judiciary perceives itself directly
threatened.
110. Other instances of problematic exercises of "plenary power" come from immigration law
(see, for example, the litigation about the rights of Haitians, "intercepted" by the United States, as
detailed in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993), and those 125,000 who
came to the United States from Cuba via the 1980 "Mariel" boatlift, many of whom remain in
federal detention, see Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, No. 93-56682, 1994 WL 111491 (9th Cir.
(Cal.)), as well as from the prosecutorial powers of the Executive. See, for example, United States
v. Alvarez.Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192-93 (1992) (obtaining jurisdiction by forcible abduction
does not offend the Due Process Clause, nor federal treaty provisions).
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the federal courts; the attributes and prerogatives of sovereignty;
sovereign immunity; taxation powers; preemption; federal common-
law-making powers; comity, abstention, and deference to other courts'
decisions."'
On the other hand, the absence from the Federal Courts canon
of federal Indian law is wholly understandable. How can one repeat
the comfortable description of consent and powers limited when one
has to grapple with the language and the decisions that require no
research into records or secondary materials, such as in Pullman or
McCardle, but are on the face of opinions and statutes on federal
Indian law? Take, for example, the United States official policies,
named in the nineteenth century "relocation" of tribes and then (in the
1950s) "termination" of Indian tribes. These decisions exemplify fed-
eral power undertaken without any reference to a document like the
Constitution, for which, ostensibly, consent was given by those gov-
erned. How does one cope with repeated Supreme Court announce-
ments of "plenary" federal power over Indian tribes? With statements
like "all aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by
Congress?"112
Recall Lawrence Sager's hypothetical of whether Congress has
constitutional authority to draw jurisdictional laws according to
race."3  The negative answer gave us comfort, because it
demonstrated that while Congress may have tremendous power, that
power was not ultimately so "plenary" as to breach norms of equal
treatment.14  But jurisdictional doctrine, under federal Indian law,
depends on race or national political identifications, 1 5 specifically
111. Consider the title of the workshop, held at the very same time as the one that was the
basis of the symposium, of the Native American Rights Section: Conflicts Between Tribal and
State Sovereignty. Jan. 8, 1994, AALS. See Native American Rights Section, American
Association of Law Schools, Oral Argument Newsletter (Nell Jessup Newton, Sept. 4, 1993).
112. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 n.10 (1985)
(quoting Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 788 n.30
(1984)).
113. Sager, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 26-30 (cited in note 70).
114. Compare Gunther's "skepticism7 that Sager's (and others) efforts to find "internal and
external limitations" on congressional power can be based on "textual, historical, and principled
bases," Gunther, 36 Stan. L. Rev. at 921 (cited in note 69). On the other hand, Gunther appears to
subscribe to limits based on the "unconstitutionality of racially (and otherwise arbitrarily)
discriminatory devices." Id.
115. The question of how to characterize Indian tribal membership-as racial, ethnic, and/or
political-is a topic of federal Indian law scholarship. See Carol Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly"
Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 169 (1991); David C. Williams, The
Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991).
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whether an individual has "Indian blood."116 And the United States
Supreme Court has drawn lines of jurisdiction based on whether one
is a member of a particular tribe." 7
How do we explain Congress's power over the Indian tribes?
For that matter, how do we explain the United States Supreme
Court's power over Indian tribes? What do we make of our Federal
Courts heroes, such as Chief Justice Marshall, who explain that
federal power emerged from a right of "discovery.""" No claim is made
that the United States Constitution justifies these exercises of federal
power. Not even weak theories of consent are offered to cushion the
blows of federal force. In short, once the federal law of the conquest of
Indian tribes is added to the canon, once McCardle and Pullman are
read in full, once one knows about problems of racism and gendered
assumptions in Federal Courts' law, a complacent story (let alone a
cheerful one) can no longer be told.
IV. THE RICHNESS THAT EMERGES
A central analytic issue for Federal Courts' jurisprudence is the
problem of sovereignty. The intellectual domains with which we work
are those of sovereignty and of the ways in which it is plausible, desir-
able, and/or practical to be a member (simultaneously) of multiple
116. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (the defendant, a "white
man," claimed that he had become a "Cherokee Indian," and therefore was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal court; the Supreme Court rejected that view, because "he was still a
white man, of the white race"). In contemporary cases, courts describe a "two-part test to be used
when trying to determine if a person is an Indian for criminal jurisdictional purposes. The first
part.. . is whether the person has some Indian blood; the second part looks to whether the person
is recognized as an Indian." United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991). Federal
regulations also use a blood-based definition for eligibility for various services. See, for example,
25 C.F.R. § 20.1(n) (1993) ("Indian means any person who is a member, or a one-fourth degree or
more blood quantum descendant of a member of any Indian tribe") (emphasis in original).
117. In 1990, the Court held in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990), that tribal courts had
limited criminal jurisdictional authority over the tribe's members but not members of other tribes.
Congress overturned that decision and authorized tribal courts to exercise that aspect of their
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. See Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
511 § 8077 (b)-(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990), as amended by Criminal Jurisdiction over
Indians Act, Pub. L. No. 102-137 § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (1991), codified at 25 U.S.C. §1301(2)-(4). See
also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), which held that Indian tribal
courts did not have any criminal jurisdiction over "non-Indians," remains good law.
118. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 573 (1823). Justice Story found that
problematic. See Joseph Story, A Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States 14-15
(Hilliard, Gray, 1834) ("It seems difficult to perceive what ground of right any discovery could
confer.").
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sovereigns. 119 Within the land of the United States, at least three
entities (states, the federal government, and Indian tribes) regularly
assert claims of sovereignty.120 But readers of the "already read"
Federal Courts canon learn of only two: states and the federal govern-
ment.
How does the inclusion of issues of Indian tribes illuminate the
conversation? Inclusion destroys a central tenet: that all federal
power can be explained by reference to the Constitution, or at least its
"penumbras." But my enterprise is not by any means one of destruc-
tion; the problems within the Federal Courts' rubric are rich, and
terribly hard. What is needed in teaching and scholarship in this field
is frank discussion of the political and social power struggles of the
present and the past and how those issues play out doctrinally and
structurally. Looking at the changes in the world since Hart and
Wechsler and adding all the misery of the Federal Courts story
actually produces several lines of inquiry,12' none of them stale,
arcane, or doctrinally deadening. To conclude, I will sketch a few
areas on which we, Federal Courts scholars, could teach and write.
Consider first some of the domestic problems in the United
States that have been the recent subject of press coverage, litigation,
or federal legislation: the environment, including nuclear waste dis-
posal, acid rain, toxic torts; social services, including education, health
care, homelessness, guns, and violence; and subordination on the
bases of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and disability. Whatever one's
list of priorities, these problems have little respect for the territorial
boundaries of the states,122 but these are the contexts in which the
119. This issue is very much a part of Hart and Wechsler, and its famous "dialogue" illumi-
nates the complexity. The book's longevity may be attributed, in part, to its capacity to be read as
laying out competing visions of how to respond. See Hart and Wechsler (cited in note 14).
120. Certain religious groups, as well as other associations, assert some forms of sovereignty
rights. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1001 (1983); Aviam Soifer, Colloquium-On Being Overly Discrete and Insular.
Involuntary Groups and the Anglo.American Judicial Tradition, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 381
(1991); Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 Yale L. J. 1713 (1988); Carol Weisbrod,
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. Family
L. 741 (1987-88).
121. See also Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholarship:
Does Doctrine Matter When Law Is Politics, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1499 (1991) (reviewing
Chemerinsky's treatise, Federal Jurisdiction (cited in note 18), and questioning its focus on
doctrine as the principal tool for understanding legal developments).
122. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 957 (cited in note 2) (correctly pointing to the central
import of the New Deal). Further, technological changes have made possible the transfer of
problems-like acid rain-that respect no state's, or nation's, borders, and the rapid transfer of
people and papers across jurisdictions.
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boundaries of authority between national and state powers are cur-
rently being crafted.' 23
Indeed, both legislative and judicial responses sometimes rec-
ognize the limited insights gained by relying on the physical bounda-
ries of the states. Congress has enacted statutes with incentive
grants, conditional grants, and joint welfare distributions, melding
state and federal functions and linking federal and state structures.
Litigation similarly cuts across state and federal lines. In several
instances, federal and state judges have responded by sitting together,
literally joining court systems. While the formal rules of the Anti-
Injunction Act and non-interjurisdictional transfers are respected, de
facto, upon occasion, the two court systems merge. One can actually
sit in a room called the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York and the Supreme Court of the State of New
York.124
Given the New Deal, the pressures toward federalization, the
national and international nature of the economy, one possibility is
that the states are a relic of a bygone age, and we simply cannot see it
yet. Federal courts scholarship might work to demonstrate that,
while the forms of the conversation remain in place,125 and "our
federalism" is routinely invoked, the reality is that the states have
become subdivisions, quasi-provinces, of the federal government.
While Justice O'Connor may attempt to insist that states are not
"mere political subdivisions of the United States,"126 the forces of
federalization, assimilation, and homogenization have been so strong
that the two systems have really melded, assimilated, folded into each
other; that Robert Cover's hoped-for innovation, borne from redun-
dancy, of related but distinct institutions cannot occur;127 that the
123. See, for example, New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (constitutionality of
congressional legislation on the disposal of low-level nuclear waste).
124. See, for example, In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 772 F.
Supp. 1380, 1385-86 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing how Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District
of New York and Justice Freedman of the New York Supreme Court 'embarked upon a coopera-
tive program for the handling of" asbestos cases from the Brooklyn Navy Yard), modified on other
grounds, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992). See also In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos
Litigation, 129 F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (joint appointment of referee).
See generally William Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, and Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1689 (1992).
125. Just as we still speak of a federal trial bench as if they were all life-tenured judges. See
notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
126. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
127. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 Wn. & Mary L. Rev. 639 (1981).
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dialogue Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff called for'28 cannot exist
because the two sets of courts, their judges, lawyers, and those liti-
gants with access are the same set of players; that no kind of case
cannot be decided by a federal court; that the sovereignty of the
states, just like that of the Indian tribes, is completely "subject to
defeasance by Congress."12
9
A second line of inquiry takes the opposite stance. It marvels
at the durability of states and their courts, at the continued existence
of Indian tribes despite express federal efforts at annihilation.
Despite the barrage of federal power and the inadequacy of funding of
the judiciaries of both state and federal governments,5 0 both states
and tribes are still around, still players, not completely assimilated.
Indeed, some have claimed a rejuvenation of state adjudication and
see states and their justice systems as a critical source of the devel-
opment of constitutional norms. 31
128. Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 83 Yale L. J. 1035 (1977).
129. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 851 n.10 (citation omitted). When this vi-
sion of federal/state power is adopted, the occasions upon which the Court recognizes state or
tribal immunity from congressional legislation are seen as outliers; the doctrinal difficulties,
debated in cases such as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (both dealing with states' Tenth
Amendment claims), and Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1976)
(offering a parallel in which tribes seek the Court's protection from Congress), exemplify the clash
between claims of authority independent from the national government and the overwhelming
power of the national government. Moreover, doctrines that appear to be supportive of state or
tribal sovereignty can be reconceived as undermining that authority by pressuring those "other
sovereigns" to assimilate to federal norms. See, for example, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (independent and adequate state ground doctrine, as reformulated by that case, requires
state judges to explain that their rulings are not predicated upon federal law). While potentially
empowering, some of the Justices have used that doctrine to point out to the "people" of a state
that they have the power to refute state justices' views of individual rights and to bring those
judges into line with prevailing federal views of more limited rights. See Florida v. Casal, 462
U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring from a per curiam dismissal of a writ as improvi-
dently granted, because of an independent and adequate state ground). See also Iowa Mutual Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (while the doctrine supports deference to tribal court jurisdic-
tion and decisions, it may also be a vehicle for attempting to assimilate tribal courts' jurisdiction
into federal norms because, in practice, doctrines of deference may be predicated on tribal court
adoption of federal views on the kind and nature of process "due").
130. See American Bar Association, Coalition for Justice, Saving Our System A National
Overview of the Crisis in America's System of Justice 1-11 (Aug. 1993) (reporting that during
1992, eight states closed their civil courts for part of the year and concluding that "the justice
system in many parts of the United States is on the verge of collapse due to inadequate and
unbalanced funding").
131. See, for example, Judith S. Kaye, Foreword The Common Law and State
Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Human Rights, 23 Rutgers L. J. 727, 728-
29 (1992) (seeing a "new chapter in American federalism and that, in addition to constitutional
pronouncement, state common law is an important source of "fairness and justice"); Shirley
Abrahamson, Reincarnation & Reawakening Long Forgotten by Civil Libertarians, State Courts
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Federal Courts scholars, circa 1994, might take as our task to
explain the longevity of the states, the state courts, the tribes, and
their courts. What is it, in the sovereignty of states or tribes, that
enables that survival, survival in the face of national, official efforts at
"termination" (in the context of tribes) and more subtle but nonethe-
less powerful assimilation pressures in the context of the states? 132 Is
the key to recognize that nothing is intrinsically within one sover-
eign's domain, essentially "federal" or essentially a matter of "state"
control, but that boundaries are fluid and must change over time? Or
is the maintenance of sovereignty dependent on the existence of
staked-out turf, of something quintessentially the business of the
states and not of the federal government?' 33
A third line of inquiry worries hard about the federal courts;
maybe they are in the process of going under. The grand old story of
the federal courts assumed that everyone agreed on the superiority of
the federal bench. However, in today's world, there are many private,
alternative dispute resolution centers, as well as wholesale delegation
of adjudication to non-Article III judges. Maybe it is time to see that
the federal courts are competing for cases, and sometimes losing that
Are Now Getting the Respect They Deserve, 19 Human Rights 26, 28-29 (1992) ("myth that state
judges play in the minor leagues of the American judicial system" is being undermined by state
judiciaries who turn increasingly to their own constitutions); Hans A. Linde, E
Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 194 (1984) (state constitu-
tional interpretation poses challenges to contemporary constitutional theory, the focus of which
has been on the United States Constitution).
132. See, for example, Herbert Wechsler's own faith in states' capacities to make their mark
on Congress and to constrain Congress from minimizing their authority. Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). Putting this question in the
context of the tribes, how are we to explain why, in 1990, Congress enacted the "Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act," 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3003 (Supp. IV 1992), which gave
tribes and not museums (such as the Smithsonian Institution) authority over the remains of tribal
ancestors? That despite all its power and numerical dominance, the federal government re-
sponded to tribal complaints about the use of skeletons? See Kara Swisher, Artifacts, Bones
Spark the Last of Indian Battles, L.A. Times at 13 (Oct. 8, 1989) (discussing the efforts to obtain
legislation and agreement by the Smithsonian); Malcolm W. Browne, As Deadlines Near,
Scientists Seek Data from Indian Bones, N.Y. Times at 1 (Sept. 25, 1990) (activities after the
legislation was enacted); Brigid Schulte, Smithsonian Packs the First Large Shipment of Native
Remains to Return to Tribes, State News Service (Sept. 5, 1991) (same).
133. Here one obvious touchstone is the viability of the concept of "essentialism," as it is
applied and used to delineate integral aspects of state sovereignty, and the relationship between
the conception of states' intrinsic authority and the allocation of jurisdiction among federal and
state courts. For deployment and critique of essentialism in the Tenth Amendment context, see
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and the literature they spawned; for the difficulties of
,essentialist" claims in feminist theory, see Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, eds., Social
Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Poastmodernism in
Feminism/Postmodernism (Routledge, 1990); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990).
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competition. Certainly, federal courts have busy dockets and a sense
of overload,134 but many judges bemoan the content of those dockets
and argue that what is on the federal docket is not worth their time.13 5
Perhaps the action is moving, as litigants with resources opt
out of the federal system and buy their own set of private judges.
Maybe the federal courts, like the nation's public schools, are at great
risk of losing their hold. Maybe the source of intrusion is not compet-
ing judges but congressional delegation of the judicial task or congres-
sional allocation of various grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts
or judicial reorganizations that have changed the nature of the
work.136 Maybe civil adjudication (as contrasted to litigation) is dead,
or dying.137 Perhaps it is the appellate courts that have undergone a
transformation so complete that they no longer resemble the appellate
world of a half-century ago, 138 and appeal as of right will soon be abol-
ished.13 9 Perhaps we should be advising federal judges of the need to
develop constituencies, and warning them that they may soon be a
quaint remnant of an earlier age.
A fourth set of questions begins by noting the limits of our
imagination, as if the choice could only be to live in a world of two sets
of courts, state and federal courts. Do not the examples of mass torts
and other large scale, state-based causes of action with people from
across the country demonstrate the need for invention? Isn't it time
134. See, for example, William W. Schwarzer and Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization
of the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice 1 (Federal Judicial Center, 1994) (discussing
the "growing trend toward 'federalization' of state crimes and civil causes of action" by the
Congress and then outlining and analyzing arguments for and against federal court jurisdiction).
135. Kenneth Conboy, Trouble in Foley Square, N.Y. Times at op-ed (Dec. 27, 1993).
136. This aspect of the problem is one very much in the minds of some members of the
federal judiciary. See, for example, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary at 4 ("Unfortunately, proposed legislative responses [to crime] have
expanded-unwisely, in my view-the role of the federal courts in the administration of criminal
justice"); Rehnquist, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. at 6-8 (cited in note 19); Schwarzer and Wheeler,
Federalization at 24-38 (cited in note 134).
137. See Judith Resnik, Judgment Held for Naught (Levine Lecture, Fordham Law School,
Oct. 1993) (forthcoming, Fordham L. Rev. 1994); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating
Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth
Century (forthcoming, UCLA L. Rev., Aug. 1994); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?
The Relationship Between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication (Schwartz Lecture,
Ohio State U. Law School, Mar. 1994) (forthcoming Ohio J. Dispute Resolution 1994).
138. See Monaghan, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 357 (cited in note 50) ("We lack a theory of the
nature of appellate courts that satisfactorily takes into account the great changes that have
occurred in the last quarter-century") (footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 357-58 (to save what he describes as the Learned Hand-Henry Hart "model" of
appellate judging, Monaghan argues that elimination of appeal as of right may be required; in the
alternative, revision of the theory of appellate adjudication will be necessary); Judith Resnik,
Precluding Appeals, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 603, 605-06 (1985) (reviewing proposals to abolish appeal
as of right).
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that we call for the creation of a third set of courts, "national state
courts," to adjudicate state-law cases in which citizens of many states
are litigants?140
A fifth endeavor asks normative questions: Which of these
different possibilities should we want to promote? The story of the
state courts as subdivisions of the national government? The theme of
the vitality of states as quasi-independent sovereigns?' 41 The impor-
tance of divergent norms? The triumph of shared values? And what
role do courts, as instruments of their governments, play in shoring up
either theme? When do courts of one sovereignty herald the genera-
tivity of alternative visions and urge deference and comity, and when
do they assert and insist on their own power?'4 These are obviously
questions about pluralism, multi-culturalism, the willingness to toler-
ate a range of behaviors called "legal," and a sense of the degree to
which one set of norms must/should/could (try to) control the country.
All of these questions should be a part of both our teaching '4 and our
scholarship.
Let me conclude with a direct response to the question asked of
all of us as symposium participants. I do not believe that Federal
Courts as a domain of either scholarship or legal education is dead,
140. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5, 52-57 (1991)
(sketching this possibility).
141. Whether Ann Althouse's work (for example, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal
Courts and State Power, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485 (1987); Tapping the State Court Resource, 44
Vand. L. Rev. 953 (1991)) exemplifies this approach is an interesting question. On one hand,
Althouse appears to call for more understanding of the generativity of state courts. See, for
example, Althouse, 44 Vand. L. Rev. at 956. On the other hand, Althouse's willingness to respect
state courts is a limited one, dependent on Justice Black's vision of state sovereignty as serving
national interests. See, for example, Althouse, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1524-27 ("Has the State
Earned Respect for Its Separateness?"); id. at 1537-38 (state "potential for enforcing federal law"
sounds more like the model of states as subdivisions of the federal courts rather than as a
"separate sphere); Althouse, 44 Vand. L. Rev. at 956 (state as a 'resource to be exploited,
encouraged, and improved); id. at 960 (use of state courts at first instance because of their
quantity and to conserve federal courts' resources).
Another view-which would take the state and tribal sovereignty theme much fur-
ther-would be that we all live in a better world when there are different loci of power, and that
respect for separateness should not depend on good behavior. Robert M. Cover's essay, Nomos
and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (cited in note 120), values communities for their jurisgenerative
power; he is also willing, however, to use the state's violence against such communities'
expressions when it is deployed to destroy "apartheid in America" or to "reform institutions when
the other officials fail." Robert M. Cover, Owen Fiss, and Judith Resnik, Procedure 729-30
(Foundation, 1988).
142. The tribal cases, such as Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978), could be read with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
143. Examples of how I have come to these views by teaching some of what is described
above are provided from the Appendix, a syllabus from my 1994,3-unit class.
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dying, or moribund. Instead, it is overflowing with possibilities, once
we agree not to see the world with the vision provided only by the
official fathers.
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APPENDIX
My understanding of the questions in Federal Courts jurispru-
dence has emerged from and been influenced by my teaching. To
exemplify how the two are currently interrelated, I provide a syllabus
for the class I taught in the spring of 1994. A few introductory com-
ments are in order. I use a syllabus as a means of providing an outline
for students of the course. In the syllabus, I state questions at the
outset and occasionally along the way. I also include on a syllabus
items that may be read at a student's option as well as those required
for the semester. The outline that follows was designed for a class
that meets three hours a week; not all of the readings below were in
fact assigned. In my experience, a fourth hour is a lovely luxury.
Syllabus, Federal Courts, Spring 1994
Introduction to Students
During the first session, we will discuss the themes of the
course:
a) the relationship between the federal courts and the
other branches of the federal government, particularly the
Congress, and to a lesser extent, the Presidency and the agen-
cies;
b) the relationship among state, federal, and Indian
tribal courts; and
c) the idea of sovereignty and the role of courts' exercise
of their jurisdiction as expressing either respect for sovereignty
or intrusion on others' sovereignty.
As you read the introductory materials, and before you come to class,
ask yourself the following questions, which we will ask many times
over the course of the semester, in different contexts:
1) What are the claimed special qualities of the federal
courts? the sources? What is your understanding of the reach
of congressional control over the federal courts? of executive
control? How does Article III of the United States Constitution
inform your thoughts on these issues?
2) Do you care if a case is litigated in state, federal, or
Indian tribal court? Why? What prompts you to have a prefer-
ence for one forum over the other?
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3) Do you have views that particular kinds of issues are
ones for the federal as compared to state or tribal courts to de-
cide? For federal as compared with state or tribal governments
to decide? What are the bases for your understanding that
something is "federal" as compared to "state" or "tribal"?
4) Is there any way to think-at a general level-about
the respective realms of authority of state, tribal, or national
courts? Or should consideration of the question always depend
on the context? Does your view depend on which political party
controls which government? On what you believe a decision
coming from a particular court is likely to be?
5) Do your views on issues of gender, race, and ethnicity
and on which forms of government are more or less aware of
and concerned about these issues affect your ideas about any of
the questions above?
The class materials will include:
a) Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System, Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J.
Mishkin, and David L. Shapiro (3d ed. 1988) [hereafter "H &
W ];
b) Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin,
and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System (3d ed. Supp. 1993) [hereafter "H & W
1993 Supp."].
c) Handouts, distributed in or before class.
d) A Federal Rules Sourcebook, such as Robert M.
Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and Judith Resnik, The Federal
Procedural System: A Sourcebook (Foundation, 1991).
I. Introduction
To help you think about these issues (and to give you some-
thing of a preview of coming attractions), as well as to remind you of
the constant and contemporary manifestations of the issues we will
think about together, please read for the first class:
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, H & W, xci-xcii; and the
articles in Handout I, specifically,
A. Federalization
Brief Description of 1992 Proposed Federal
Legislation (all creating proposed new federal
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causes of action), excerpted from The Third
Branch at 10 (July, 1992).
The Hon. Kenneth Conboy, Trouble in Foley Square,
New York Times (Dec. 27, 1993) at A15.
B. De-federalization
Proposed Bills S. 583 ("To limit the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in matters relating to
abortion"), 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981), and H.R.
867 ("To limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the district courts in certain cases"),
97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981) (Handout I).
C. The Composition of the Federal Life-Tenured
Judiciary
Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final
Imprint, 76 Judicature 282 (1993).
Robert A. Carp, Donald Songer, C.K. Rowland, Ronald
Stidham, and Lisa Richey-Tracy, The Voting
Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush,
76 Judicature 298 (1993).
D. The Relationships Among the States and the Federal
Government
Isabel Wilkerson, Airport Battle Grows in Chicago, New
York Times (Jan. 9, 1991) at A10.
Robert Reinhold, States, Failing to Cooperate, Face a
Nuclear Waste Crisis, New York Times (Dec. 28,
1992) at Al.
E. Claims of Sovereignties
Lindsey Gruson, Town in Seneca Nation Learns Indians
Are Taking It All Back, New York Times (Dec. 2,
1991) at B12.
In addition, sometime during the first two weeks, please read
the overview, provided in H & W, of the Development of the Judicial
System: pages 1-64. Much of the material contained therein will be
familiar to you from procedure and constitutional law, but a reminder
of the history is useful.
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II. The Relationship Among the Branches of the Federal
Government
After we discuss the introductory, overview materials, we will
then turn to the first major substantive topic, the relationship among
the branches of the federal government (which often goes under the
name "separation of powers"). The central issue for this section is who
(the courts, Congress, and the Presidency) has what powers
(jurisdiction, review, appointment, salaries, etc.) over whom.
A. Judicial Review of Congressional and Executive
Action
Read Marbury v. Madison, H & W, 72-79 and notes 1, 3,
4, and 5, found at 79-86.
B. Congressional Control Over Federal Court
Jurisdiction
Here the focus is on what limits, if any, exist under the
Constitution of Congress's control over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The first cut is whether Congress can control the courts via
jurisdictional grants and their repeal.
Reread Article III, as you will many times, as well as Article II,
section 2. Also read:
Ex Parte McCardle, H & W, 364-65.
Ex Parte Yerger, H & W, note 1 found at 365.
For our discussion in class: Consider Marbury in light of the
proposed legislation (in Handout I) to limit the federal courts' jurisdic-
tion. What are the sources for Chief Justice Marshall's decision that
the Court lacked jurisdiction in Marbury? How do the issues in
McCardle differ from those in Marbury? Why do you/might you care
whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in any of these cases?
Why might Congress seek to limit or expand the federal jurisdiction?
Then read: S.1647 ("Neighborhood School Transportation
Relief Act of 1981"), 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981)
(Handout II).
Review: S.583 and HR 867 (Handout I).
What light do McCardle and Yerger shed on the constitutional-
ity of H.R. 867 or S. 583? How does S. 1647 differ? As you look at
these bills, consider the differences: which attempt to restrict the
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appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts? the remedial powers of the courts? jurisdiction
over statutory claims? constitutional claims? Why, were you in the
legislature, might you make any of the above distinctions? What
distinctions are made in Article III? To sort these issues through, also
review:
Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last
Three Terms, 62 Law Week 3124, Aug. 17, 1993
(Handout II).
Judicial Workload Indicators Fiscal Years 1991 and
1992 (Handout II).
United States v. Klein, H & W, 368-69.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon, H & W 1993 Supp. 57-58.
Sheldon v. Sill, H & W, 362-63.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112. S. Ct. 2206 (1992)
(Handout II - the majority opinion, section II B).
Notes, H & W, 366-68 (Justice Story's views); 370-87
(the general arguments made); H & W 1993 Supp.
59-60.
C. Congressional Creation of Non-Article III Courts
The next set of issues relate to whether Congress can "control"
federal jurisdiction by moving sets of cases into non-Article III courts.
Read the class problem: Article III\Article I "Courts" (Handout II).
Then read the relevant case law:
1. The Example of the Bankruptcy Courts: "Units" of the
Federal Courts
Northern Pipeline, H & W, 425-53; notes, H & W,
465-73.
Justices'Lobbying, NY Times (Dec. 12, 1982) at 21
(Handout II).
Bankruptcy Amendments, 28 USC §§ 151, 152, 157-58
(Handout II).
Grandfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, H & W 1993 Supp.
62-64.
2. Agencies
Crowell v. Benson, H & W, 387-93.
CFTC v. Schor, H & W, 454-65.
Christopher Ladd, CFTC Judges Claim Agency
Undermines Their Role, Legal Times
(Feb. 8, 1988) at 1 (Handout II).
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S.950, ("Administrative Law Judge Corps Act"), 100th
Cong., 1st Sess (1987) (Handout II).
3. Magistrate Judges
28 USC §§ 621-635 (skim), § 636 (read) (Handout II).
Christopher Smith, Who Are the U.S. Magistrates?, 71
Judicature 143 (1987) (Handout II).
Notes, H & W, note 10, 472-73.
Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 65-66.
4. Court-appointed Arbitrators
28 USC §§ 651-658 (Handout II).
5. "Court Reform"
Antonin Scalia: Remarks on the Work of the Federal
Courts, 34 Federal Bar News & Journal 252
(1987) (Handout II).
D. Congressional Control Over Article III Judges' Work
Yet another possibility is congressional direction to Article III
judges about the nature and context of their work. Consider:
Hayburn's Case, H & W, 89-93, 95-97.
The Tidewater Issue, H & W, 473-478.
Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
E. Executive and Congressional Control Over the
Judiciary: Judicial Nomination, Selection,
Promotion, and Impeachment
Another aspect of control relates to the composition of the
judiciary and the respective realms of executive, judicial, and congres-
sional authority to appoint and impeach federal judges.
Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Nominations:
The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas
Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. R. 1279 (1992) (excerpts).
Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: The
Nomination of Robert Bork, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1146
(1988) (excerpts).
Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
F. The Federal Courts' Control Over Their Own
Jurisdiction
Yet another vehicle for control is played out in the discussions
about which branch of government has the capacity to decide the
meaning of the word "case" and when an issue is "justiciable."
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Hayburn's Case began our discussion, which we will continue by read-
ing Lujan (on standing and causes of action) and Nixon (on the politi-
cal question doctrine). While we could do much more with these
issues, the rest of the assignments are listed to show you what else
you might read, but we will not discuss them in class.
1. The Interpretations of "Cases" and "Controversies"
Standing/ Causes of Action
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
H & W 1993 Supp. 17-34; Notes, 34-37.
2. Doctrines of Deference to Other Branches
The Political Question Doctrine
Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
(See also H & W, 270-95).
3. Interpretation of Congressional Grants of Jurisdiction
Congress can attempt to "mandate" that courts decide particular kinds
of issues. The success and lack thereof of this technique can be seen
in the following materials.
The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
H & W, 295-361.
The Former Certiorari/Appeal Distinctions and Practice
H & W, 692-748.
H & W, 1993 Supp. 209-16.
III. The Relationship Between the Federal and State Systems:
Supreme Court Review of State Courts
The Independent and Adequate State Ground Rule
A. The Background
The Basics
H & W, 533.
Fox Film, H & W, 534-35.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, H & W, 504-16.
Notes, H & W, 516-21.
Murdock v. City of Memphis, H & W, 521-30.
Notes, H & W, 530-32.
B. Independent
Michigan v. Long, H & W, 539-47.
Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983) (Handout III).
Elizabeth Kolbert, In Civil Liberties Cases, New York's
Court Leans on the State Constitution, NY Times
(Jan. 8, 1990) at Al (Handout III).
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Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 39-41.
C. Adequate
Ward v. Love, H & W, 581-84.
H & W 1993 Supp. 77-78.
Henry v. Mississippi, H & W, 610-18.
Note 2, 619-20; note 8(c), 625-27.
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984) (Handout III).
Problem: When Is a Decision Independent and
Adequate? (Handout III).
IV. The Reconsideration of Other Courts' Decisions by the
Lower Federal Courts
A. Habeas Corpus
1. The Process of Conviction
Dudley Clendinen, Race and Blind Justice Behind
Mixup in Court, NY Times (Nov. 3, 1985) at A26
(Handout IV).
Michael McConville and Chester Mirsky, Criminal
Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 652 (1988) (Handout IV).
William Glaberson, Confronting Assembly-line Justice,
NY Times (Jan. 16, 1990) at B1 (Handout IV).
Harry I. Subin, 230,000 Cases, Zero Justice, NY Times
(Dec. 19, 1991) at A31 (Handout IV).
Note on Right to Counsel, H & W 1993 Supp. 218-19.
2. The Legal Structure
Read 28 USC §§ 2241-2254, and § 2255 (Handout IV).
Introduction, Larry Yackle, excerpts from Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331 (1993)
(Handout IV).
a. Exhaustion of state remedies
H & W, 1552-60.
H & W, 254-55.
b. The role of procedural default
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
(Handout IV).
U.S. ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1955) (Handout IV).
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991) (Handout IV).
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Ronald Smothers, A Shortage of Lawyers
to Help the Condemned, NY Times
(June 4, 1993) at A21 (Handout
IV).
McCleskey v. Zant, H & W 1993 Supp.
253-54.
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, H & W 1993
Supp. 252-53.
c. The relevance of "collateral attacks"
Teague v. Lane, H & W 1993 Supp.
222-38; notes, 238-45.
Sawyer v. Whitley, H & W Supp. 250, and
Justice Blackmun's dissent, 112
S. Ct.2514 (1992) (Handout IV).
Neil Lewis, Court Hears Condemned
Man's Plea of Innocence, NY
Times (Oct. 8, 1992) at B22
(Handout IV).
H & W 1993 Supp. 247 (Herrera).
The standard on review, H & W 1993
Supp. 220-22.
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994)
(Handout IV).
d. The hostility to claimants
New York Times Editorial, The High
Court v. Habeas Corpus, NY
Times (Jan. 4, 1992) at A12
(Handout IV).
H & W 1993 Supp. 255.
e. The "right" to a federal forum
Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The
Supreme Court and the Habeas
Courts, 66. S. Cal. L. Rev. 2467
(1993) (Handout IV).
B. Relitigation in the Federal Lower Courts of Other
Federal Rights Litigated or Arguably Litigated in
the State Courts
Allen v. McCurry, H & W, 1615-23.
Notes, 1624-27; 1630.
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
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H & W, 1627-29.
Marrese, on remand, 628 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(Handout IV).
C. Relitigation of Issues Decided in the Tribal Courts
How is the conversation about federal courts as "intrusive" and
criminal law enforcement as essential to sovereignty informed by
considering the tribal context?
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC §§ 1301,
1302, 1303 (Handout IV).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978) (Handout IV).
Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (Handout IV).
Katie Hickox, House Passes Duro Legislation, State
News Service (Oct. 22, 1991) (Handout IV).
Pub. L. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1893; as amendedby
Pub. L. 102-137, (Oct. 28, 1991), 105 Stat. 646
(Handout IV).
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9
(1987) (Handout IV).
Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F.
Supp. 919 (D. Mont. 1988) (Handout IV).
S. 2747, ("Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of
1988"), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 10, 1988)
(Handout IV).
V. Other Doctrines of Deference
A. Roles for the Federal Courts: Generative or
Destructive?
1. The Idea of Deference: Federal Courts as Jurispathic
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (Handout V).
Excerpts from briefs in Santa Clara (Handout V).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes (review
from Handout IV).
Model Code Governing Courts of Indian
Offenses, 25
U.S.C. § 1311 (Handout V).
2. Many Roles for Sovereigns
Barry Meier, Casinos Putting Tribes at Odds NY
Times (Jan. 13, 1994) at D1 (Handout V).
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3. Celebrating Federal Court Power to Intervene
Monroe v. Pape, H & W, 1229-39.
B. Deference to the States: Court-made Doctrines of
Comity and Abstention
1. "Pullman" Abstention
Railroad Commission v. Pullman, H & W, 1354-
56, Notes, H & W, 1356-64.
Excerpts from the record in Pullman, 312 U.S.
496 (1941) (Handout V).
England v. Louisiana Board of Medical
Examiners, H & W, 1375-78.
2. Diversity, and "Burford" or Administrative
Abstention
Lehman Bros., H & W, 1378-81.
New Orleans Public Service. v. Council
City of New York, H & W 1993
Supp. 205-13.
Notes, H & W, 1364-67.
"Thibodaux" Abstention:
Notes, H & W, 1368-75.
3. The "Domestic" Relations and Probate Exception
H & W, 1456-59; 1460-64.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards
112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (from Handout II).
H & W 1993 Supp. 216-17.
4. Exhaustion of State Court and Administrative
Remedies
Preiser v. Rodriguez, H & W, 1638-49.
Notes, H & W, 1049-1652.
Patsy v. Board of Regents, H & W, 1350-51.
H & W 1993 Supp. 200-02.
See Fair Assessment in Real Estate v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (Handout
VI) and H & W, 1343-45.
5. Younger: "Our Federalism"
Younger, H & W, 1383-92.
Notes, H & W, 1392-1405.
Steffel v. Thompson, H & W, 1406-15.
Notes, H & W, 1152-56.
Hicks and Miranda, H & W, 1416-20.
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Notes, H & W, 1424-38.
H & W 1993 Supp. 214.
6. "Colorado River" Abstention
Colorado River Water Conservation District, H &
W, 1438-46.
Notes, H & W, 1446-54 (especially Will v.
Calvert and Moses Cone).
Review res judicata (See habeas section), and
review Allen v. McCurry.
7. Mechanisms for Coordination
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1993 Year
End Report, 26 Third Branch 1 (Jan.
1994) (Handout V).
Clifford Wallace, Before State and Federal Courts
Clash, 24 Judges' Journal 36 (1985)
(Handout V).
Richard L. Madden, For a Complex Case, A
Singular Mediation Effort, NY Times
(Feb. 5, 1988) at All (Handout V).
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy Weiss, and Alan
Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Parallel Litigation in the
State and Federal Courts, 5 FJC
Directions 9 (Aug. 1993) (Handout V).
A Synthesis of Participants'Ideas: From a
Symposium on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships (1992), 5 FJC Directions 3
(Aug. 1993) (Handout V).
Tribal courts/state courts project enters new
phase, 19 National Center for State Court
Report 2 (Feb. 1992) (Handout V).
C. Deference to the States: The Statutory Context
1. The Tax Injunction Act
28 USC §1342.
Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S. 503
(1981) (Handout V).
Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100 (1981) (Handout V).
2. The Anti-Injunction Act
Atlantic Coast Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
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Locomotive Engineers, H & W, 1308-14.
Mitchell v. Forster, H & W, 1315-20.
H & W 1993 Supp. 197-98.
D. Preemption as a Doctrine of Deference
California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272 (1987) (Handout V).
E. Preferences, Politics, and Time
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1105 (1977) (Handout V).
Nat'l Center for State Courts, 17 Survey of Judicial
Salaries 10 (1991) (Handout V).
Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy,
22 W. & M. L. Rev. 639 (1981)
(Handout V).
Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts
Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 (1988) (Handout
V).
F. Interdependencies
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
671 (1989) (Handout V).
As you read the excerpts from Neuborne, Cover, Fallon, and
me, consider: when the author is writing; what is each author's view of
how the federal courts approach particular problems might be fairly
characterized (as "liberal," "conservative," "activist," "able,"
"incompetent" etc.); that author's view of the state courts on the same
dimensions; what the sources for assumptions about state and federal
courts are (i.e., resources? elan? caseload? life tenure? etc.); the
claimed differences, if any, between the state and federal courts, and
their sources; and the relationship(s) that each author believes is
proper for the federal and state courts? Obviously, these issues are
not addressed to the same degree in each excerpt, but these questions
should serve as a guide to reading the articles and imagining a con-
versation among the writers.
VI. Other "Sovereigns" as Litigants in the Federal Courts




1. Attributes of Sovereignty
Lindsey Gruson, Town in Seneca Nation Learns
Indians Are Taking It All Back, NY
Times (Dec. 2, 1991) at B.12 (See
Handout I).
Isabel Wilkerson, Airport Battle Grows in
Chicago, NY Times (Jan. 9, 1991) at A10
(See Handout I).
Ronald Smothers, States Battle U.S. and Other
States Over Waste, NY Times (Jan. 28,
1991) at A21 (Handout VI).
2. The Case Law
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Handout
VI).
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985: the
Legislative History (Handout VI).




Ruth Lapidoth, Sovereignty in Transition, 45
Journal of International Affairs 325
(1992) (Handout VI).
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Supreme Court Review
341 (Handout VI).
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 54 Columbia Law Review 543
(1954) (Handout VI).
B. Tribes Seeking Court Protection from Congress
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73 (1976) (Handout VI).
C. The States as Defendants, Seeking Court Protection
from Suit
1. The Eleventh Amendment
Hans v. Louisiana, H & W, 1162-66.
Notes, 1159-62; 1166-73.
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H & W 1993 Supp. 148-50.
ExParte Young, H & W, 1173-79.
Notes, 1179-1182.
Edelman v. Jordan, H & W, 1182-91.
Notes, 1191-95.
Pennhurst, H & W, 1195-1204.
Atascadero v. Scanlon, H & W, 1204-13.
Notes, H & W, 1213-21.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, H & W, 1216-18.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., H & W Supp.
152-69.
Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 170-71.
D. The Immunity of Indian Tribes1
(See Santa Clara Pueblo, Section V, above)
VII. "Federal" Cases in Federal Courts
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
1. 28 USC § 1332, as amended (1988) (Handout VII)
H & W, 1656-67.
H & W 1993 Supp. 263-64, 267-268.
2. Choice of Law
28 USC §§ 1652 (RDA) and 2072 (REA)
(Handout VII).
H & W 1993 Supp. 86-87.
Erie, H & W, 743-87.
Erie and the Federal Rules, Notes, 787-91,
Hanna, H & W, 818-826, 749-71.
Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 88-89.
Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, H & W 1993 Supp. 90-92
(& Carnival Cruise) Multi-forum torts, H
& W 1993 Supp. 120.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
1. The Constitution Grant of Jurisdiction
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., H & W, 967-75.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, H & W,
1. At times I have also taught other immunity doctrines-statutory constructions that
provide immunity for cities (Monroe to Monel) and the immunities of judges, prosecutors,




Notes, Verlinden, H & W, 986-89.
Mesa v. California, H & W 1993 Supp.
130-31.
American National Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct.
2465 (1992) (Handout VII) or H & W 1993
Supp. 129-30.
2. The Statutory Grant of Jurisdiction
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, H &
W, 989-90.
American Wellworks, H & W, 990-92.
Smith v. Kansas City, H & W, 992-95.
Notes, H & W, 995-99.
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham, 489 U.S.
838 (1989) (Handout VII).
Merrell Dow, H & W, 1007-20.
Notes, H & W, 1020-27.
Franchise Tax, H & W, 1027-38.
Notes, H & W, 1038-40.
Christianson v. Colt Industries, H & W 1993
Supp. 94-95.
Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 132.
3. The Concept of a Federal "Case": Pendent State
Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Gibbs, H & W, 1040-44.
Notes, H & W, 1044-52.
Review Pennhurst.
H & W 1993 Supp. H & W, 134-37,
(Finley).
28 USC § 1367 (Handout VII).
C. Sources of Law
1. 'There is No Federal Common Law"
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, H & W, 783-87.
2. Federal Common Law
Note, H & W, 839.
Clearfield Trust, H & W, 854-57.
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973) (Handout VII).
Note, H & W, 857 (Friendly's praise of the
common law).
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Boyle v. United Technologies, H & W 1993 Supp.
96-111
Notes, H & W 1993 Supp. 111-18 (Miree v.
DeKalb, DeSylvia).
Textile Workers, H & W, 878-83.
Oneida Indians v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661 (1974) (Handout VII).
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (Handout
VII); or H & W 1993 Supp. 118-19.
3. Implied Causes of Action
a. Statutory
J.L Case v. Borak, H & W, 935-38.
Texas Industries v. Radcliff, H & W,
938-43.
Review Santa Clara Pueblo (Handout V).
Franklin v. Gwinnett School County
Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028
(1992) (Handout VII).
Suter v. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992)
(Handout VII).
b. Constitutional
Bivens v. Six Unknown FBI Agents, H &
W, 917-25.
Notes, H & W, 926-35.
H & W 1993 Supp. 121-22, 124 (note: in
lieu of note 9 on p. 933).
H & W 1993 Supp, 123 (Fallon & Meltzer
on constitutional remedies).
4. Borrowing State Law
a. Statutes of Limitations
Notes, H & W, 953-59.
H & W 1993 Supp. 124-28.
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1992)
(Handout VII).
Felder v. Casey, H & W 1993 Supp. 80-82.
b. Damages
Monessen Southwestern Railroad Co. v.
Morgan, 486 U.S. 1306 (1988)
(Handout VII).
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5. The Federal Common Law of Remedies
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct.
748 (1992) (Handout VII).
